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RECENT CASES
"LAW OF THE CASE"-RULING BY AN APPELLATE
COURT THAT A LEGAL THEORY WAS WAIVED AT
TRIAL PRECLUDES PRESENTATION OF THAT
THEORY ON REMAND-People v. Shuey, 13 Cal. 3d 835,
533 P.2d 211, 120 Cal. Rptr. 83 (1975).
In People v. Shuey,l the California Supreme Court re-
solved two major issues, one procedural and one substantive.
The court held that a party who has waived a legal theory by
failing to raise it at the trial level may not argue that theory
when the case is remanded to the trial court for a hearing on
specific issues. In addition, the Shuey court concluded that
where there is no showing of probable cause to arrest, emer-
gency circumstances precipitated by law enforcement officers
themselves do not justify "securing" premises while a search
warrant is obtained.
On December 22, 1971, a confidential informer told Officer
Fisk of the Los Angeles Police Department that within the past
four days he had seen five "lids" of marijuana in the apartment
of an individual named Paul who resided at a certain address
in Canoga Park.' Five days later, Officer Fisk and two fellow
officers went to the address given by the informer to investigate
the suspected narcotics violations. When the defendant, Paul
Shuey, answered the door, Fisk identified himself as a police
officer, revealed that he had information that there was mari-
juana at the location and sought permission to conduct a
search of the premises. Shuey refused to either discuss the
matter or consent to a search, and Fisk left to obtain a search
warrant.' Meanwhile, the two remaining officers entered the
apartment, uninvited but without any physical resistance by
Shuey, to "secure" the premises. During Fisk's absence, the
officers did not search the apartment, but merely kept Shuey
under observation to ensure that he would not destroy or re-
move the suspected contraband. Fisk returned with a search
warrant some three hours later, and the subsequent search of
the apartment resulted in seizure of marijuana and ampheta-
1. People v. Shuey, 13 Cal. 3d 835, 533 P.2d 211, 120 Cal. Rptr. 83 (1975).
2. Id. at 838, 533 P.2d at 214, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 86.
3. Id. at 838-39, 533 P.2d at 214, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 86.
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mines.' Shuey and his wife Vicki, who was not present in the
apartment at the time of the search, were arrested and charged
with one count each of possession of marijuana,' possession of
marijuana for sale,' and possession of amphetamines.7
At the pretrial hearing, the defendants moved to suppress
the narcotics on the ground that they were fruits of an illegal
search and seizure.8 The motion was denied, and the defen-
dants sought review by statutory writ of mandate9 before the
California Court of Appeal for the Second District. In Shuey v.
Superior Court (Shuey I),"° the court of appeal held that the
police conduct constituted an illegal seizure of the entire con-
tents of the apartment and granted the writ." Upon remand
the trial court was directed to limit its determination to
whether the evidence sought to be suppressed was factually the
fruit of the illegality."2
When the hearing on the motion to suppress was reopened,
the People sought permission to present the issues of whether
there had been probable cause to arrest and whether a valid
arrest had in fact occurred. 3 The prosecution had attempted
to raise this theory before the court of appeal, but had not been
permitted to do so on the ground that the People, by failing to
plead an arrest theory before the trial court, had expressly
waived reliance on such a theory." The trial court, relying on
4. Shuey v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. App. 3d 535, 538, 106 Cal. Rptr. 452, 454
(1973).
5. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11530 (1970), as amended, § 11357 (West 1975).
6. Id. § 11530.5 (1970), as amended, § 11359 (West 1975).
7. Id. § 11910 (1970), as amended, § 11377 (West 1975).
8. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1538.5 (West Supp. 1975).
9. Id. § 1538.5(i).
10. 30 Cal. App. 3d 535, 106 Cal. Rptr. 452 (1973).
11. The California Supreme Court denied the People's request for a hearing.
12. When the actual search and seizure is pursuant to a warrant, it is the burden
of the party making the motion to suppress to prove that but for the invasion of the
occupants' privacy, the search would have been fruitless. Shuey v. Superior Court, 30
Cal. App. 3d 535, 544, 106 Cal. Rptr. 452, 458 (1973); CAL. EvID. CODE § 664 (West
1966).
13. People v. Shuey, 13 Cal. 3d 835, 839, 533 P.2d 211, 214, 120 Cal. Rptr. 83, 86
(1975).
14. Shuey v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. App. 3d 535, 539, 106 Cal. Rptr. 452, 458
(1973). The court said:
At the time of the motion to suppress, the People expressly disavowed any
claim that there was a right to make an arrest of Paul before the contra-
band was actually found. The same principle which forbids us to reexam-
ine the validity of the warrant [which the defendants had not contested
at the original hearing] keeps us from basing our decision on a theory
which the People expressly discarded.
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the court of appeal's holding, denied the People's motion to
reopen the issue and confined the hearing to the question of
whether "but for" the illegality the contraband would have
been destroyed prior to its discovery. 5 The court found that the
defendant would indeed have destroyed the narcotics and, ac-
cordingly, granted the motion to suppress and dismissed the
information."
The People appealed from the dismissal, 7 and the case
was heard by a different division of the court of appeal." In
People v. Shuey (Shuey II), 11 the second appellate panel held
that the trial court had erroneously interpreted the Shuey I
ruling on the waiver issue. As a result, the court reversed and
again remanded, with directions to the trial court to vacate its
order, reopen the hearing, and determine whether there existed
probable cause to arrest the defendants at the time of entry
into their apartment."
At this point the California Supreme Court, on its own
motion,' granted a hearing to determine (1) whether the pur-
ported redetermination of the waiver issue by the court of ap-
peal in Shuey H was valid; and (2) if not, whether the search
and seizure in question could be justified without recourse to
theories based on probable cause to arrest.22
In an unanimous decision written by Justice Mosk, the
supreme court held that the determination made by the court
of appeal in Shuey I was a ruling on a point of law which, once
made, constituted the law of the case to which all further pro-
ceedings must adhere. 3 Additionally, the court approved the
granting of the motion to suppress, holding that "securing" the
premises was an illegal seizure such as to compel exclusion of
any evidence obtained in the subsequent search.
15. People v. Shuey, 13 Cal. 3d 835, 839, 533 P.2d 211, 214, 120 Cal. Rptr. 83, 86
(1975).
16. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1385 (West 1970).
17. Id. § 1238(a)(7) (West Supp. 1975).
18. Whereas Shuey I was decided by Division 5 of the California Court of Appeal
for the Second District, Shuey II was heard by Division 2.
19. 115 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1974).
20. Id. at 452.
21. CAL. R. CT. 28(a) (emphasis added) provides in part: "Within 30 days after
a decision of a Court of Appeal becomes final as to that court, the Supreme Court, on
its own motion, or on petition as provided in subdivision (b), may order the cause
transferred to itself for hearing and decision . .. ."
22. People v. Shuey, 13 Cal. 3d 835, 840, 533 P.2d 211, 215, 120 Cal. Rptr. 83, 87
(1975).
23. Id. at 840-47, 533 P.2d at 215-20, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 87-92.
24. Id. at 848-50, 533 P.2d at 220-22, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 92-94.
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The doctrine of the law of the case is a rule of procedure
designed to prevent continued relitigation of the same issue
within a single case. The doctrine declares that when, in decid-
ing a case, an appellate court states in its opinion a principle
or rule of law necessary to the decision, that principle or rule
becomes the law of the case and controls all further litigation
in that case, both in the lower court and upon subsequent
appeal. 5 The doctrine applies, moreover, even though another
court, hearing a subsequent appeal, is of the opinion that the
former decision was erroneous in that particular." Since the
doctrine is a procedural and not a substantive rule, however,
it will not be applied when to do so would result in a patently
unjust decision."7
The People, relying on the reasoning in Shuey II, main-
tained that the "law of the case" rule was inapplicable; since
the issue of probable cause to arrest was "not before" the first
appellate court, the People argued, there could be no decision
on it as an issue." This assertion was in line with the holding
in DiGenova v. State Board of Education, where it was held
that law of the case "does not extend to points of law which
might have been but were not presented and determined on a
prior appeal."29 The California Supreme Court, however, was
not persuaded by this line of argument. The fact that the court
in Shuey I expressly declined to base its decision on the issue
of probable cause to arrest was irrelevant, since the court in
Shuey II was concerned not with the substance of that issue,
but rather with the ability of the People to raise it.'" The first
appellate court's ruling that the arrest issue had been expressly
25. Tally v. Ganahl, 151 Cal. 418. 421, 90 P. 1049, 1050 (1907).
26. Id.
27. People v. Medina, 6 Cal. 3d 484, 492, 492 P.2d 686, 691, 99 Cal. Rptr. 630,
635 (1972); Pigeon Point Ranch, Inc. v. Perot, 59 Cal. 2d 227, 231, 379 P.2d 321, 323,
28 Cal. Rptr. 865, 866 (1963).
28. People v. Shuey, 115 Cal. Rptr. 447, 450 (1974). In Shuey I the court declared
that there were two issues which were not before it: (1) the validity of the search
warrant, and (2) the existence of probable cause to arrest. The former was not an issue
because its "validity was not attacked at the 1538.5 hearing," while the latter issue
was excluded from consideration on the basis that it was a theory which "the People
expressly discarded." Shuey v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. App. 3d 535, 539, 106 Cal. Rptr.
452, 454 (1973).
29. 57 Cal. 2d 167, 179, 367 P.2d 865, 871, 18 Cal. Rptr. 369, 375 (1962). However,
law of the case does apply to issues which were necessarily or impliedly litigated on
appeal. Steelduct Co. v. Henger-Seltzer Co., 26 Cal. 2d 634, 160 P.2d 804 (1945).
30. People v. Shuey, 13 Cal. 3d 835, 844, 533 P.2d 211, 218, 120 Cal. Rptr. 83, 90
(1975).
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waived3' in the People's arguments before the lower court pre-
cluded the prosecution from attempting to present that theory
on remand.2
Dismissing as irrelevant the People's argument that Shuey
I had no res judicata effect,33 the supreme court emphasized
that res judicata and law of the case are separate doctrines. Res
judicata settles the rights of the parties once the judgment has
become final,34 and generally is important only where there is
more than one action. 5 Law of the case, which applies only to
separate proceedings in the same case,36 does not settle any
rights; it merely settles the law according to which rights will
be decided until the judgment is final,37 and as a rule of proce-
dure, it will not be applied when application would produce an
unjust result. Whereas the action of the court in Shuey II was
not erroneous by virtue of principles of res judicata, it was
nonetheless improper on the basis of law of the case.3"
31. In a footnote, the California Supreme Court observed that the People's open-
ing brief described the case as follows:
In the instant case at the time this matter came on for a hearing. . . the
issue presented, to wit: "whether police who have probable cause to be-
lieve that a residence contains contraband, but have neither a search
warrant, nor probable cause to arrest anyone in the home, may force entry
for the sole purpose of preventing the disposal of the contraband while
other officers obtain a warrant," had never before been decided in an
appellate court in the State of California . . . . Accordingly, the deputy
district attorney herein urged only that the officers' action was justified
based upon probable cause that contraband was in the residence and
declined to urge that there was probable cause to arrest the respondent
Paul Shuey.
People v. Shuey, 13 Cal. 3d 835, 843 n.3, 533 P.2d 211, 217 n.3, 120 Cal. Rptr. 83, 89
n.3 (1975) (emphasis in original).
32. Cf. Archer v. City of Los Angeles, 19 Cal. 2d 19, 119 P.2d 1 (1941) (sufficiency
of pleadings is an issue subject to foreclosure by law of the case). In Shuey, the waiver
was an oral concession entered in the trial court record. The supreme court, however,
reasoned that the sufficiency issue was essentially the same. 13 Cal. 3d at 843, 533 P.2d
at 217, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 89.
33. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1538.5 (West Supp. 1975) specifically provides for further
review on appeal where a pre-trial writ of mandate has been denied. See People v.
Medina, 6 Cal. 3d 484, 492 P.2d 686, 99 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1972).
34. 4 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Judgments § 162, at 3306 (2d ed. 1971).
35. Id. § 147, at 3292.
36. 6 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Appeal § 646, at 4564 (2d ed. 1971).
37. Id. § 633, at 4552.
38. Moreover, it appears that the court in Shuey II based its reasoning on an
incomplete reading of Medina. The supreme court noted that, on the same page of the
opinion discussing the inapplicability of res judicata, the court said:
The foregoing considerations do not apply to invocation of the doctrine
of the law of the case on an appeal from a judgment of conviction after
an appellate court has denied a defendant's application for pretrial writ
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Finally, the California Supreme Court concluded that
application of the doctrine of the law of the case would not
result in an unjust decision. While declining to define com-
pletely the circumstances to which the "unjust decision" ex-
ception might properly be applied, the court did observe that
there must at least be demonstrated a "manifest misapplica-
tion" of existing legal principles resulting in "substantial injus-
tice" before an appellate court may reject a ruling on a point
of law made in a prior appellate proceeding." The Shuey court
held that, by not allowing the People to raise a legal theory for
the first time on appeal, the court in Shuey I correctly applied
existing legal principles."
Citing Giordenello v. United States,' the People con-
tended that a decision rejecting a new theory on appeal would
not preclude the presentation of that theory on remand in the
lower court.2 In Giordenello, the United States Supreme Court
declined to consider a theory raised by the prosecution for the
first time on appeal, but indicated that the trial court could
permit the People to present evidence upon this new theory on
remand. 3
In Giordenello, however, the Supreme Court reversed a
conviction and returned the case to the lower court for retrial,
whereas in Shuey the court of appeal merely issued a writ of
mandate and remanded for resumption of a hearing." Thus,
review under section 1538.5 by a written opinion which decides the merits
of a search and seizure contention.
People v. Medina, 6 Cal. 3d 484, 492, 492 P.2d 686, 691, 99 Cal. Rptr. 630, 635 (1972).
39. People v. Shuey, 13 Cal. 3d 835, 846, 533 P.2d 211, 219, 120 Cal. Rptr. 83, 91
(1975).
40. The court cited Lorenzana v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 3d 626, 640, 511 P.2d
33, 43, 108 Cal. Rptr. 585, 595 (1973). The Lorenzana court said:
If the People had other theories to support their contention that the
evidence was not the product of illegal police conduct, the proper place
to argue those theories was on the trial level at the suppression hearing.
The People offered no such argument at that hearing and may not do sofor the first time on appeal. To allow a reopening of the question on the
basis of new legal theories to support or contest the admissibility of the
evidence would defeat the purpose of Penal Code section 1538.5 and
discourage parties from presenting all arguments relative to the question
when the issue of the admissibility of evidence is initially raised.
Id. (emphasis added).
41. 357 U.S. 480 (1958).
42. People v. Shuey, 13 Cal. 3d 835, 846 n.4, 533 P.2d 211, 219 n.4, 120 Cal. Rptr.
83, 91 n.4 (1975).
43. Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 488 (1958). See also People v.
Hamilton, 71 Cal. 2d 176,182, 454 P.2d 681, 685, 77 Cal. Rptr. 785, 789 (1969).
44. People v. Shuey, 13 Cal. 3d 835, 846 n.4, 533 P.2d 211, 219 n.4, 120 Cal. Rptr.
83, 91 n.4 (1975).
[Vol. 16
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although it is permissible to present new legal theories upon
retrial, it is improper to do so in the context of a rehearing to
determine a specific issue.45
On the search and seizure issue, the California Supreme
Court approved the Shuey I court's conclusion that "emer-
gency circumstances" precipitated by the police officers them-
selves did not justify "securing the premises" while a search
warrant was obtained."
The question of whether the police have the authority to
"'secure" a residence prior to obtaining a search warrant is a
problem which has arisen in the aftermath of Chimel v.
California,47 where the scope of a search incident to arrest was
limited by the United States Supreme Court to a search of the
arrestee's person and the area "within his immediate con-
trol."48 Prior to the Chimel decision, if a suspect were arrested
at his home, law enforcement officials frequently would search
the entire house for evidence to be used against the arrestee."
By no longer permitting police to search areas from which the
suspect could not get a weapon or destroy evidence, Chimel
made mandatory the obtaining of a search warrant prior to
45. Indeed, the Court in Giordenello specifically stated,
[lilt would not be sound judicial administration to send the case back
to the District Court for a special hearing on the issue of probable cause
.... The facts on which the Government now relies to uphold the arrest
were fully known to it at the time of trial, and there are no special
circumstances suggesting such an exceptional course.
357 U.S. at 488 (1958) (citation omitted). Clearly, Giordenello does not touch on the
question of what issues may properly be raised when a case is remanded for resumption
of a hearing.
46. The court noted that since the Shuey I decision had become final, the su-
preme court itself was precluded by the doctrine of law of the case from re-examining
the substantive merits of the search issue unless it could be shown that failure to do
so would result in manifest injustice. People v. Shuey, 13 Cal. 3d 835, 848, 533 P.2d
211, 220, 120 Cal. Rptr. 83, 92 (1975). Despite this observation, the court did none-
theless consider the substantive merits of the search issue. In a partially dissenting
opinion, Justice Clark stated,
The requisite showing of injustice has not been made here. Nevertheless,
the majority reaches the search issue, gratuitously lending this court's
authority to the contention that police may not "secure" premises prior
to obtaining a search warrant. The question being foreclosed by the law
of the case, I express no opinion concerning it.
Id. at 851, 533 P.2d at 222, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 94.
47. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
48. Id. at 763.
49. Under the principles of Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947), and
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950), which constituted the controlling
precedents prior to Chimel, items obtained in such a search were admissible in evi-
dence as having been legally seized incident to the arrest of the suspect.
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conducting a more extensive search for incriminating evidence.
The response to Chimel of law enforcement officials
throughout the country0 was immediate and highly critical,
with regard to both the limitations imposed upon then-existing
police procedures5' and the Court's failure to offer any guide-
lines as to what procedures would be acceptable in the future.
One of the most significant problems raised by Chimel, as
viewed by the police, concerned the procedure to be followed
when police arrest a suspect at his home and have probable
cause to believe that seizable evidence is located on the prem-
ises, but, because circumstances precluded their obtaining a
search warrant prior to making the arrest or because probable
cause appeared only in the process of actually making the ar-
rest, they do not have a search warrant.52 A strict reading of
Chimel would require the police to leave the premises and ob-
tain a search warrant before conducting a more thorough
search, despite the fact that friends or relatives of the arrestee
might in the meantime destroy or remove the items sought by
the police. Police officers in such a situation are thus faced with
50. Respondent State of California's petition for rehearing was joined by the
attorneys general of 36 states and territories. Carrington, Chimel v. California-A
Police Response, 45 NOTRE DAME LAW. 559, 568 n.58 (1970), citing Respondent's Peti-
tion for Rehearing at 13-14, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
51. The District Attorney of Los Angeles County estimated that perhaps 90
percent of the cases scheduled for trial in that county could be affected by Chimel.
Carrington, Chimel v. California-A Police Response, 45 NOTRE DAME LAW. 559, 569
(1970), citing Respondent's Petition for Rehearing at 4, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752 (1969).
52. The State of California's petition for rehearing stated the problem as follows:
Assuming that the police effecting the arrest will already have suffi-
cient information to obtain a search warrant, or will acquire such by
reason of their observations at the time of the arrest (and this is decidedly
not always the case), one of the most troublesome problems presented is:
May the officers summon other officers to ensure that other persons pres-
ent, or expected, on the premises will not destroy or secret incriminating
evidence while a search warrant is being obtained? What if there are
several persons who are not arrested and who remain on the premises?
Does this authorize the police to station several officers on the premises
and physically to restrain each occupant any time the occupant ap-
proaches any evidence which might readily be disposed of? As pointed
out by the dissent [Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 775 n.5 (1969)],
the invasion of the privacy of the other occupants (who are perhaps inno-
cent of any wrong doing) would be at least as great as that resulting from
a warrantless search of the premises incident to the lawful arrest of the
suspect.
Carrington, Chimel v. California-A Police Response, 45 Notre Dame Law. 559, 570
(1970), citing Respondent's Petition for Rehearing at 11, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752 (1969).
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the choice of making a warrantless search incident to the ar-
rest, with the risk that all evidence so obtained will be ordered
suppressed, or of leaving to obtain a search warrant and ulti-
mately discovering that evidence necessary for the conviction
of the arrestee has been removed or destroyed.
In recognition of the practical problems which Chimel
created for effective law enforcement administration, a number
of commentators in the immediate post-Chimel period sug-
gested, as an alternative, that police officers be permitted to
"secure" the premises while awaiting the arrival of a search
warrant.53 Under such a procedure, one or more officers would
remain at the scene of the arrest to control access to the place
to be searched while a search warrant was being obtained.
While recognizing that such a "securing" process might be as
violative of constitutional rights as an initial warrantless
search for a specific item would have been, most commentators
viewed the alternative procedure as "less intrusive"54 and,
under the circumstances, "necessary to safeguard the legiti-
mate public interest in criminal law enforcement.""5
Prior to the decision in Shuey I, there were only two Cali-
fornia cases which even remotely considered the issue of
whether the police can legally "secure" a residence while other
officers obtain a search warrant. In Barajas v. Superior
53. PROJECT ON LAW ENFORCEMENT POLICY AND RULEMAKING, MODEL RULES FOR
LAW ENFORCEMENT-WARRANTLESS SEARCHES OF PERSONS AND PLACES 27-30 (1973); Bur-
nett, Search Warrants: Impact and Applications of Chimel and Spinelli and Related
Problems, 29 FED. B.J. 170, 174-76 (1970); Carrington, Chimel v. California-A Police
Response, 45 NOTRE DAME LAW. 559, 570, 573, 588-94 (1970); Note, Police Practices and
the Threatened Destruction of Tangible Evidence, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1465, 1475-85
(1971); Comment, Chimel v. California, 49 ORE. L. REV. 411, 414-15 (1970); Comment,
Scope Limitations for Searches Incident to Arrest, 78 YALE L.J. 433, 446 (1969).
54. Note, Police Practices and the Threatened Destruction of Tangible Evidence,
84 HARV. L. REV. 1465, 1475-76 (1971).
55. PROJECT ON LAW ENFORCEMENT POLICY AND RULEMAKING, MODEL RULES FOR
LAW ENFORCEMENT-WARRANTLESS SEARCHES OF PERSONS AND PLACES 29 (1973).
56. The United States Supreme Court has never addressed the permissibility of
"securing" a residence prior to obtaining a search warrant. The court in Shuey I,
however, read Mr. Justice White's dissenting opinion in. Chimel as arguably to the
effect that such a procedure would be improper. Mr. Justice White felt that it was
unreasonable to require the police to leave the scene in order to obtain a
search warrant when they are already legally there to make a valid arrest,
and when there must almost always be a strong possibility that confeder-
ates of the arrested man will in the meanwhile remove the items for which
the police have probable cause to search.
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 774 (1969) (emphasis added). The Shuey I court
felt that
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16
Court,57 the Court of Appeal for the Second District found that
because the police had probable cause to arrest defendant be-
fore entering the house, their subsequent action in securing the
premises was legal." Since the People were estopped from pres-
enting the Barajas theory,59 the prosecution relied on People v.
Edgar,6" the other pre-Shuey case. In Edgar, police had over-
heard the defendant, who was in jail awaiting trial, tell his
mother to hide certain photographs which were in their home.
Officers went immediately to the Edgar home and, when Mrs.
Edgar returned, requested that she turn over the pictures. She
produced them unwillingly after being illegally threatened with
arrest. Although the evidence was ordered suppressed on the
basis of the illegal arrest threat, the California Supreme Court
observed that the police could have kept Mrs. Edgar under
surveillance until a search warrant was obtained."
The Shuey I court was unpersuaded by this line of argu-
ment and distinguished Edgar from the instant case on the
basis of the nature of the exigent circumstances present in each
case. In Edgar, the court reasoned, the emergency arose when
the defendant's instruction to his mother was overheard." If
it is nevertheless of some significance that Mr. Justice White assumed
that if the police could not search incident to the arrest, they had no
choice but to leave the premises, thereby permitting confederates of the
arrestee to remove incriminating evidence.
Shuey v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. App. 3d 535, 541 n.7, 106 Cal. Rptr. 452, 456 n.7
(1973). But see People v. Freeny, 37 Cal. App. 3d 20, 34, 112 Cal. Rptr. 33, 43 (1974),
which construes Chimel to permit "securing" under the proper circumstances.
57. 10 Cal. App. 3d 185, 88 Cal. Rptr. 730 (1970).
58. Id. at 189-92, 88 Cal. Rptr. at 731-34. The court reasoned that the continued
presence of the police in the apartment had nothing to do with the later seizure of the
contraband pursuant to the warrant, because petitioner could not make a factual
showing that the contraband would not have been there had the police taken her to
the station to be booked.
59. See text accompanying notes 13-15 supra.
60. 60 Cal. 2d 171, 383 P.2d 449, 32 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1963).
61. Id. at 175-76, 383 P.2d at 452, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 44. The Edgar court, however,
did not specify whether such surveillance should be conducted from inside or outside
the home. It could be argued that the court was merely referring to surveillance con-
ducted from outside the home, for in the next paragraph of its decision the court,
quoting from People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 438, 282 P.2d 905, 907 (1955), stated,
[Ilmportant as efficient law enforcement may be, it is more important
that the right of privacy guaranteed by these constitutional provisions be
respected. Since in no case shall the right of the people to be secure
against unreasonable searches and seizures be violated, the contention
that unreasonable searches and seizures are justified by the necessity of
bringing criminals to justice cannot be accepted.
60 Cal. 2d at 176, 383 P.2d at 452, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 44 (emphasis in original).
62. Actually, the court in Edgar did not characterize the situation as that involv-
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the police had stopped to obtain a warrant prior to arriving at
the residence, their mission would most probably have been
unsuccessful, as Mrs. Edgar would have had more than enough
time to dispose of the pictures. 3 In Shuey, however, the emer-
gency did not arise until the police confronted the defendant
and informed him of their suspicions. Having received the tip
from the informant five days earlier, the police had been af-
forded sufficient time in which to procure a search warrant
before proceeding to the defendants' home. The emergency was
created by the police themselves64 and, as such, could not be
used to justify the warrantless seizure of the premises.
The court in Shuey I specifically declined to comment on
the proper result where the police are faced with an emergency
not of their own making." That issue, however, was resolved in
a case decided in the interim between the Shuey I decision and
the hearing granted by the supreme court. In People v.
Freenyj5 the California Court of Appeal held that a valid emer-
gency to preserve evidence will justify the action of the police
in securing premises prior to obtaining a search warrant. 7 Al-
though never specifically stated, the clear implication of the
Shuey decision is that the California Supreme Court has ap-
proved the securing of premises in situations where, as in
Freeny, there exists a valid emergency, not created by the po-
lice themselves, to preserve evidence while a search warrant is
being obtained.
However, rather than seizing upon Shuey as an occasion
for promulgating a fixed rule delineating all circumstances
under which the police may properly secure premises, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court limited its decision to the specific fact
situation presented by Shuey. The court suggested that the
ing an emergency. Indeed, the court specifically rejected the People's claim that an
emergency situation existed by noting that, since the police knew that Edgar had
instructed his mother to hide the pictures and not to destroy them, there was no danger
of the destruction of evidence. Id. at 175-76, 383 P.2d at 452, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 44.
63. Shuey v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. App. 3d 535, 540, 106 Cal. Rptr. 452, 455
(1973).
64. Id. at 541, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 455.
65. Id. at 541, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 456.
66. 37 Cal. App. 3d 20, 112 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1974). See also Ferdin v. Superior
Court, 36 Cal. App. 3d 774, 112 Cal. Rptr. 66 (1974). In both these cases, officers had
probable cause to arrest, and exigent circumstances were present.
67. Federal courts have also held that "narcotics that are threatened with immi-
nent removal or destruction provide an exceptional circumstance justifying a warrant-
less search." United States v. Blake, 484 F.2d 50, 54 (8th Cir. 1973).
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police may secure premises prior to obtaining a search warrant
when faced with an emergency to preserve evidence, but did
not define what constitutes a valid emergency. Does an emer-
gency situation exist when police have probable cause to be-
lieve that there is evidence or contraband on the premises,
despite the fact that there were no friends or relatives of the
arrestee present at the time of the arrest? It is apparent that
such a definition of emergency would perhaps be too broad, for
as Mr. Justice White observed in his dissent in Chimel, "there
must almost always be a strong possibility that confederates of
the arrested man will in the meanwhile remove the items for
which the police have probable cause to search . ... ,68
Similarly, the Shuey court specifically declined to com-
ment on the scope or validity of probable cause to arrest as a
basis for the securing process. At the outset of its opinion on
the search issue the court cautioned that, "since the arrest
issue is not before us we make no ruling on that question, and
nothing herein should be taken to indicate that the search
would have been valid had the arrest issue been properly
raised."6 Barajas is therefore left standing as authority for the
proposition that probable cause to arrest an occupant of a par-
ticular residence, standing alone, is sufficient justification for
securing the premises while awaiting the arrival of a search
warrant.
The reluctance of the Shuey court to establish a general
standard defining the circumstances to which the securing pro-
cess may legitimately be applied is indicative of the sensitive
nature of the competing interests in this area of the law. On the
one hand, the court must consider the interests of the state in
obtaining evidence necessary for the conviction of criminals. If
the police must always leave the scene of an arrest to obtain a
search warrant when it is reasonably apparent that the evi-
dence which they seek will have been removed or destroyed by
the time they return, the general public interest in effective law
enforcement will be seriously undermined. On the other hand,
the court must consider the interests of the individual in being
68. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 774 (1969).
69. People v. Shuey, 13 Cal. 3d 835, 848, 533 P.2d 211, 220, 120 Cal. Rptr. 83, 92
(1975). Moreover, the Shuey court specifically recognized the trial court's opinion that
the contraband would have to be suppressed even if the People were permitted to raise
and prove the arrest theory, because "you make the arrest at the door rather than going
in." Id. at 848 n.6, 533 P.2d at 220 n.6, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 92 n.6.
[Vol. 16
1976] PEOPLE V. SHUEY 651
secure from unreasonable invasions of his or her privacy. In this
context, if the police are permitted to secure a residence when-
ever an arrest is made, the constitutional rights of the persons
involved could conceivably be rendered almost meaningless.
It is highly probable that an ultimate resolution of this
problem must await a ruling by the United States Supreme
Court. Until such a definitive ruling is made, however, the
courts must determine what is reasonable under the fourth
amendment on a case-by-case basis. In holding that the actions
of the police in Shuey constituted an illegal seizure, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court has taken the first step in arriving at such
a solution.
James D. Streit
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-TRIAL ON TRANSCRIPT OF
PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION- SUBMISSION ON
TRANSCRIPT OF PRELIMINARY HEARING INCLUDING
STIPULATION DECREASING CHARGE TO BE CONSID-
ERED IS A BAR TO SUBSEQUENT PROSECUTION ON
THE GREATER CHARGE; BEFORE SUBMISSION IS
ACCEPTED DEFENDANT MUST BE ADVISED OF HIS
RIGHTS-Bunnell v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 592, 531 P.2d
1086, 119 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1975).
Petitioner Mack Vernon Bunnell was charged by informa-
tion with the murder of his wife.' In the superior court the case
was submitted for decision on the transcript of the preliminary
hearing.' By stipulation some additional evidence was also con-
sidered.' In addition, it was agreed between the parties that the
petitioner could not be convicted of first degree murder.4 Peti-
1. CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 187, 189 (West Supp. 1975) (statutes defining murder and
the degrees of murder).
This case deals exclusively with procedural issues. Consequently, the supreme
court's decision did not, and this note will not, deal with the facts surrounding the
alleged murder. Only procedural facts will be discussed.
2. A submission on the transcript of the preliminary examination is an agree-
ment between the parties in a criminal case to waive a jury trial and also to waive thepresentation of witnesses and additional evidence. The defendant agrees that "the
transcript may be considered in lieu of the personal testimony of the witnesses who
appeared at the preliminary hearing." Bunnell v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 592, 599,
531 P.2d 1086, 1090, 119 Cal. Rptr. 302, 308 (1975). Virtually any agreement between
the prosecution and defense on the evidence to be submitted is possible provided the
trial court agrees. For example, in Bunnell the defendant agreed to the consideration
of otherwise inadmissible evidence. Id. at 603, 531 P.2d at 1093, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 309;
see People v. Clements, 202 Cal. App. 2d 284, 286, 20 Cal. Rptr. 766, 768 (1962).
The purpose of the preliminary hearing (or preliminary examination) is to deter-
mine which cases should continue to trial and which are groundless or unsupported.
CAL. PEN. CODE § 872 (West 1970); see Comment, Criminal Discovery at and Before
the Preliminary Hearing, 15 SANTA CLARA LAW. 665, 679 (1975).
It should be noted that there are several types of submissions in addition to
submissions on the preliminary transcript. See People v. Bird, 132 Cal. 261, 64 P. 259(1901). Submissions are broadly defined as "a contract between two or more parties
whereby they agree to refer the subject in dispute to others. ... BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1594 (4th ed. 1968). Further, submissions can be considered a specialized
form of stipulation which itself is merely an agreement between the parties or, when
made in open court as here, an agreement between the parties and the court. 46 CAL.
JUr. 2d Stipulations § 2 (1959).
3. 13 Cal. 3d at 599-600, 531 P.2d at 1090, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 306-07. The People
reserved the right to present certain documentary and physical evidence to rebut
petitioner's defense. In addition, "petitioner subsequently stipulated to consideration
by the court of a transcript of a conversation he had with an investigating police officer
shortly after his arrest .. " Id.
4. See id. at 599 nn. 2-3, 531 P.2d at 1090 nn. 2-3, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 306 nn. 2-3(partial text of submission agreement).
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tioner did not testify, though he reserved the right to do so.
After review of the transcript and other evidence submit-
ted, the trial court found Bunnell guilty of second degree mur-
der. The court of appeal subsequently reversed the conviction
on the ground petitioner had been denied a fair trial.5
Following the issuance of the remittitur, the case was set
for trial on a charge of second degree murder, new counsel was
appointed, and a jury trial was requested.7 The People opposed
the request, arguing that the submission had been part of a
bargained-for disposition.' They claimed that if petitioner
could withdraw from that bargain by requesting a jury trial,
they in turn could recharge Bunnell with first degree murder.
The trial court held that the reversal of the previous judg-
ment without direction by the court of appeal had voided the
submission agreement; as a result, "the accusatory pleading
stood as if no trial had been conducted," and the charge of first
degree murder was reinstated.'
Petitioner then sought leave to enter a plea of former jeop-
ardy, asserting that his prior conviction had implied an acquit-
5. This determination was based on various comments by the trial judge. When
questioning petitioner regarding his understanding of the agreement to submit, the
judge said that the trial would be of a very limited sort and that "the agreement is
that you wouldn't be found guilty of anything other than second degree murder." Id.
at 599 n. 3, 531 P.2d at 1090 n. 3, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 306 n. 3 (emphasis added). Further,
the judge warned Bunnell that "the result is already decided" and that he should not
"think that something is going to happen where I am going to find you not guilty ...
or guilty of manslaughter or something like that." Id. The court of appeal as well as
the supreme court apparently felt these remarks indicated that the judge understood
the disposition to be a "slow plea" of guilty to a charge of second degree murder. Id.
The supreme court noted that the court of appeal could have reversed the convic-
tion on the ground that petitioner's waiver of his rights and agreement to submit was
not voluntary and intelligent since the record demonstrated that petitioner did not
intend to admit his guilt and did not understand the effect of the submission. Id. at
599, 531 P.2d at 1090, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 306. However, the court of appeal seemed to
emphasize the statements of the trial judge and held that this indicated he had pre-
judged the case, thereby denying the petitioner a fair trial. Id.
6. A remittitur of record is the return of the record of a cause to the trial court
where the cause arose for whatever action the appellate court might direct-here, a
new trial. Upon final determination of an appeal, the clerk of the appellate court
"remits" a copy of the judgment or order of the appellate court to the clerk of the trial
court. This returns the proceeding to the trial court and revests it with jurisdiction. 5
CAL. JuR. 3d Appellate Review § 604 (1974).
7. 13 Cal. 3d at 600, 531 P.2d at 1091, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 307.
8. The People claimed that the submission had been part of a bargain whereby
petitioner agreed to submit in return for the People's agreement to lower the maximum
charge to be considered upon submission to second degree murder. Id. at 601, 531 P.2d
at 1091, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 307.
9. Id.
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tal of the greater charge of first degree murder.'" This plea was
rejected by the trial court." Bunnell sought a writ of prohibi-
tion to restrain trial on any charge greater than second degree
murder.' 2 The California Supreme Court granted this writ. 3
In ruling on the petition, the supreme court made two
major determinations. First, the court held that since a sub-
mission was a trial for double jeopardy purposes under the
doctrine of implied acquittal embodied in section 1023 of the
Penal Code, the prosecution's agreement to a limitation of the
charge presented by the submission had impliedly acquitted
petitioner of first degree murder, thereby barring prosecution
on such a charge upon retrial. 4 Second, it held that the trial
court's obligation to advise a defendant of his constitutional
rights before acceptance of a guilty plea 5 or a submission char-
acterized as "tantamount to a plea of guilty"" should be ex-
10. California has two pleas relating to double jeopardy: "once in jeopardy" and
"former conviction or acquittal." CAL. PEN. CODE § 1016 (West 1970) (permissible
pleas). Both of these pleas can be used in either constitutional or statutory double
jeopardy situations.
A constitutional double jeopardy claim is based on the fifth amendment of the
United States Constitution and article one, section 15, clause 4 of the California Con-
stitution. Out of this constitutional protection arose the doctrine of implied acquittal.
See Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323 (1970); Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
Under this doctrine, when the finder of fact has the opportunity to return a verdict on
a greater charge and instead returns a verdict on a lesser included offense, the defen-
dant was impliedly acquitted of the greater charge and subsequent prosecutions on
that charge are barred. See Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. at 398-99.
California also has statutory double jeopardy provisions. See CAL. PEN. CODE §§
654, 1023 (West 1970). Section 1023 of the Penal Code provides a statutory implied
acquittal doctrine which does not require a defendant to be brought to trial on the
greater charge to receive implied acquittal benefits. See People v. Greer, 30 Cal. 2d
589, 597, 184 P.2d 512, 517 (1947). The prosecution of a lesser included charge bars
any subsequent prosecutions on greater charges based on the same set of facts even
though the finder of fact never had the opportunity to return a verdict on those greater
charges.
Petitioner alleged and his plea of "former jeopardy" encompassed both constitu-
tional and statutory implied acquittal. See notes 31-42, 52-62 and accompanying text
infra (summary and analysis of the court's application of implied acquittal theories to
the facts of the case).
11. 13 Cal. 3d at 601, 531 P.2d at 1091, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 307.
12. See CAL. CODE CIv. PRO. §§ 1102-04 (West 1970) (procedures for seeking writ
of prohibition). Bunnell also sought a writ of mandate to compel change of venue. See
id. §§ 1084-87 (procedures for seeking writ of mandate). The writ of mandate was
denied. 13 Cal. 3d at 601, 531 P.2d at 1091, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 307.
13. 13 Cal. 3d at 610, 531 P.2d at 1097, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 313.
14. Id. at 612, 531 P.2d at 1098, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 314.
15. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969); In re Tahl, 1 Cal. 3d 122, 460
P.2d 449, 81 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1969); note 10, supra.
16. See In re Mosley, 1 Cal. 3d 913, 926 n.10, 464 P.2d 473, 480 n.10, 83 Cal. Rptr.
809, 816 n.10 (1970).
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tended to cover all submissions. 7
The court first considered whether jeopardy should attach
at all in a submission." After considerable manipulation, the
conclusion was that jeopardy should attach. To reach this deci-
sion the court had to deal with the case of In re Mosley, in
which it had held that some submissions may be characterized
as "tantamount to a plea of guilty."' 9
In Bunnell, the supreme court clarified Mosley, dispelling
the misconception that had caused some lower courts to focus
on the guilty plea analogy and thus lose sight of the trial-like
aspects of a submission." The court explained that the lan-
guage "tantamount to a plea of guilty" in Mosley had been
compelled by its attempt to extend Boykin v. Alabama and In
re Tahl to the limited class of submissions in which the defen-
dant acknowledges that conviction is probable."' Such an un-
fortunate choice of words, the court noted, had blurred the real
objective of Mosley, which was to assure that the defendant
was aware of his constitutional rights in a situation in which
those rights might be waived.2 Therefore, the court explained,
although a submission involved the waiver of many of the same
rights as does a plea of guilty, a submission does not carry with
it the same consequences as a guilty plea.
17. 13 Cal. 3d at 605, 531 P.2d at 1094, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 310.
18. Id. at 601-02, 531 P.2d at 1092, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 308.
19. In re Mosley, 1 Cal. 3d at 924, 464 P.2d at 479, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 815. In Mosley
the defendant sought a writ of habeas corpus from a conviction which followed the
submission of his case upon the transcript of the preliminary examination. Id. at 917-
20, 464 P.2d at 474-76, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 810-12. Defendant had not testified, nor had
witnesses been called in his behalf at the preliminary examination. Further, the cross-
examination of the prosecutor's witness raised no significant doubt as to the truth of
that testimony which was legally sufficient to support a conviction.
The supreme court in Mosley held that submission under these circumstances was
"tantamount to a plea of guilty" and was a waiver of a whole panoply of rights,
including the right to a jury trial, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses,
and the privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 924-25, 464 P.2d at 479, 83 Cal. Rptr.
at 815. Previously, the California Supreme Court in In re Tahl and the United States
Supreme Court in Boykin v. Alabama had held that the same rights are waived by a
plea of guilty and that before such a plea could be accepted by the court, the record
must indicate that the defendant had been informed of these rights and had made a
voluntary and intelligent waiver thereof. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969);
In re Tahl, 1 Cal. 3d 122, 460 P.2d 449, 81 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1969). Mosley held that when
a submission is "tantamount to a plea of guilty," the same constitutional and statutory
safeguards which a plea of guilty requires must apply. 1 Cal. 3d at 927, 464 P.2d at
481, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 817.
20. See 13 Cal. 3d at 602-03, 604-05, 531 P.2d at 1094, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 310.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 604, 531 P.2d at 1093, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 310.
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In further distinguishing a submission from a guilty plea,
the court noted that a not-guilty plea, until withdrawn, re-
mains in effect even though the case is submitted, and carries
with it certain consequences not involved in a guilty plea.23 The
presumption of innocence is retained and the burden of the
prosecution to overcome that presumption by proof beyond a
reasonable doubt also remains.24 In addition, the defendant
retains the statutory right to appeal, not available if conviction
is based upon a plea of guilty, and the scope of appellate review
is unaltered.25
In short, "the defendant who submits his cause on the
transcript does not give up his right to trial, only to a jury
trial .. ."2 Thus, "whether or not the prior proceeding was a
'slow plea' [of guilty], it did constitute a trial for all purposes
relevant to the issues" before the court.27 The court might have
clarified its holding further by noting that in a submission the
defendant does not admit his guilt, and the case is actually
decided on the merits.
Having established that a submission is a trial for doublejeopardy purposes, and recognizing that California has a statu-
tory "former acquittal" provision in addition to its constitu-
tional double jeopardy provision, the court proceeded to deter-
mine at what point in a submission jeopardy attaches." The
rule is established in California that jeopardy attaches "when
a defendant is placed on trial on an accusatory pleading in a
court of competent jurisdiction, and . . ., if jury trial has been
waived, the trial 'entered upon' by the reception of evidence or
otherwise."" Since submission on the transcript of the prelimi-
nary hearing is considered in lieu of the personal testimony of
witnesses who appeared at the preliminary examination, the
23. Id. at 603, 531 P.2d at 1094, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 309.
24. Id.; see CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 1019 (not guilty plea puts in issue every material
allegation of the accusatory pleading), 1096 (presumption of innocence and the burden
of the prosecution) (West 1970).
25. See id. §§ 1237 (right to appeal decisions from superior court), 1237.5 (limita-
tion of right to appeal when conviction is upon a plea of guilty or nolo contendere).
26. 13 Cal. 3d at 604, 531 P.2d at 1093, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 309.
27. Id. at 600, 531 P.2d at 1091, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 307.
28. Id. at 601-02, 531 P.2d at 1092, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 308.
29. Id. at 601, 531 P.2d at 1092, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 308. The rule was stated inPeople v. Hernandez, 250 Cal. App. 2d 842, 848, 58 Cal. Rptr. 835, 839 (1967). That
case and many subsequent cases quoted the rule directly from Witkin. 1 WITKIN, CAL.
CRIMEs, Defenses § 184, subd. 2, at 178 (compiling previous California cases which
developed the rule).
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supreme court concluded that a trial is "entered upon" and
jeopardy attaches when the stipulation to submit is accepted
by the trial court.3 0
Finally, the court applied constitutional and statutory
double jeopardy provisions to the facts of the case to determine
whether the conviction on a charge of second degree murder
had impliedly acquitted defendant of the charge of first degree
murder. 31 The constitutional doctrine of implied acquittal
arose from the cases of Price v. Georgia and Green v. United
States.32 In Price, the United States Supreme Court held that
the prohibition against double jeopardy relates not only to
being twice punished, but also to being twice put at risk of
being convicted for the same offense. 3 Thus, when a defendant
has been brought to trial on an offense, jeopardy attaches.
Jeopardy on that offense ends "when [a] jury [is] given a full
opportunity to return a verdict on that charge and instead
[reaches] a verdict on [a] lesser charge."34
Applying these principles in Bunnell, the California Su-
preme Court concluded that when the submission was accepted
by the trial court, the stipulation to decrease the charge was
also accepted and defendant was never exposed to the risk of
conviction of first degree murder. 5 Therefore, there was no
implied acquittal of that offense and the constitutional doc-
trine of double jeopardy did not bar prosecution of Bunnell for
first degree murder on retrial.
However, in addition to constitutional prohibitions against
double jeopardy, California has established a statutory doc-
trine of implied acquittal and double jeopardy. Section 1023
of the Penal Code provides:
When the defendant is convicted or acquitted or has been
once placed in jeopardy upon an accusatory pleading, the
30. 13 Cal. 3d at 602, 531 P.2d at 1092, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 308.
31. Id. at 606-08, 531 P.2d at 1095-96, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 311-12.
32. Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 328-29 (1970); Green v. United States, 355
U.S. 184, 190 (1957).
33. Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. at 326.
34. Id. at 329; Green v. United States, 355 U.S. at 191.
35. 13 Cal. 3d at 607-08, 531 P.2d at 1096, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 312.
36. CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 654 (acts made punishable in different ways cannot be
punished in more than one way), 1023 (conviction, acquittal or jeopardy for one offense
bars subsequent prosecution of a greater or lesser included offense) (West 1970).
Greater or lesser included offenses are those crimes involving the same set of operative
facts, but varying in the quality of the crime or the severity of the penalty imposed.
See BLACK'S LAW DIcriONARY 1048 (4th ed. 1968).
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conviction, acquittal or jeopardy is a bar to another prose-
cution for the offense charged in such accusatory pleading,
or for an attempt to commit the same, or for an offense
necessarily included therein, of which he might have been
convicted under that accusatory pleading. 7
This has been interpreted to bar prosecution for a greater of-
fense when the defendant has previously been prosecuted for a
lesser included offense.38 If this were not the rule, "section 1023
could be vitiated by the simple device of beginning with a
prosecution of the lesser offense and proceeding up the scale."39
Applying this doctrine to the facts of the case, the court
held that Bunnell was placed in jeopardy on a charge of second
degree murder when the court accepted the agreement to sub-
mit, accompanied by the People's stipulation that defendant
was to be convicted of an offense no greater than second degree
murder." This jeopardy was held to be an immediate bar to a
subsequent prosecution for first degree murder.
The court felt such a decision was compelled in order to
avoid a situation in which
a defendant charged with and convicted of a lesser in-
cluded offense could not appeal without running the risk
of a new prosecution for a greater inclusive offense,
whereas a defendant charged with the greater offense but
convicted only of the lesser offense could appeal without
running such risk under the doctrine of implied acquittal.4,
Thus, "although petitioner is no longer bound by his waivers
and stipulation, having once been tried for second degree mur-
der he may not now be tried for or convicted of a greater of-
fense."42
37. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1023 (West 1970).
38. The conception was first developed by the cases of People v. McDaniels 137
Cal. 192, 69 P. 1006 (1902); People v. My Sam Chung, 94 Cal. 304, 28 P. 642 (1892).
Though these cases didn't specifically refer to section 1023 of the Penal Code, their
principles clearly apply. People v. Greer, 30 Cal. 2d 589, 184 P.2d 512 (1947), applied
these principles directly to section 1023:
Although section 1023 refers to a situation where the prosecution for the
greater offense is first in time, there is no such limitation in the cases. If
the defendant is tried first for assault and later for battery, the prosecu-
tion for the included offense bars the subsequent prosecution for the
greater offense.
Id. at 597, 184 P.2d at 517.
39. Id.
40. 13 Cal. 3d at 607-08, 531 P.2d at 1096, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 312.
41. Id. at 608, 531 P.2d at 1096, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 312.
42. Id.
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The court made one additional finding. Explaining the
decision in Mosley, the Bunnell court held that the objectives
of assuring that the defendant is aware of his constitutional
rights and that his waiver of those rights is voluntary and intel-
ligent and made with an awareness of the consequences
thereof, it is no less important in a submission in which the
defendant contests his guilt than it is in a submission that is
"tantamount to a plea of guilty."43 In addition, the court recog-
nized that the necessity of distinguishing between submissions
"tantamount to a plea of guilty" and those in which a defen-
dant contests his guilt has unnecessarily burdened the trial
courts.4 Therefore, in order to relieve the trial courts of this
burden and to insure that defendants are aware of the rights
they surrender in any submission, the court held that in all
submissions on the transcript of the preliminary examination,
the record must indicate that the defendant has been advised
of his rights and has expressly waived those rights. 5
This last conclusion of the court is by far its most reasona-
ble. Though the court acknowledged that some of the require-
ments are not constitutionally compelled, it felt the additional
burden imposed on the trial court was substantially out-
weighed by the benefits of assuring defendants all their rights,
as well as by lessening the burden on appellate courts which,
since Mosley, had been forced to review the trial court determi-
nation as to whether a particular submission was "tantamount
to a plea of guilty."
43. Id. at 604, 531 P.2d at 1094, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 310.
44. The facts do not indicate that trial courts have been burdened by the distinc-
tion. Los Angeles County accounts for the vast majority of all submissions on the
transcript of the preliminary examination each year. Graham & Letwin, The Prelimi-
nary Hearing in Los Angeles: Some Field Findings and Legal Policy Observations, 18
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 635, 638 n. 5 (1971). The Criminal Trial Judge's Benchbook of the
Los Angeles Superior Court recommends that the trial court advise the defendant of
his rights in all submissions. See Los ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT, CRIMINAL TRIAL JUDGES'
BENCHROOK 266 (Jan., 1971). Though it is not clear exactly how strictly this recommen-
dation was followed, it weakens the "burden" rationale for the decision in Bunnell.
45. 13 Cal. 3d at 605, 531 P.2d at 1094, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 310. Specifically, the
court required that in all submissions defendant be advised of the nature of the charges
and the direct consequences of conviction as well as of his right to a jury trial, his right
to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him and his privilege against self-
incrimination. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI; CAL. CONST. art. I, §§ 15, 16. In addi-
tion, when defendant does not reserve the right to present evidence in his own defense,
he must be advised of that right, and when he does not preserve that right and does
not plan to contest his guilt in argument before the court, he must be advised of the
probability of conviction. Finally, in all cases, before the court may accept a submis-
sion, express waivers of the rights involved must be taken.
46. 13 Cal. 3d at 605, 531 P.2d at 1094, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 310.
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Justice Clark, in dissent, objected to this holding solely
because it was not constitutionally compelled. 7 It appears,
however, that only two of the requirements-that the defen-
dant be advised of the probability of conviction when he does
not plan to contest his guilt, and that he be advised of and
waive his privilege against self-incrimination-are not consti-
tutionally compelled.48 Although the privilege against self-
incrimination is not clearly waived in all submissions, and al-
though no constitutional provision requires that a defendant
who will not contest his guilt be advised of the probability of
conviction, both of these requirements can easily be justified
as an exercise of the supervisory powers of the California Su-
preme Court.49
There are good reasons, however, for a court to confine its
holdings to those compelled by the facts of the case decided. A
narrow holding avoids overbroad decisions with which the
court may be forced to struggle in the future as a result of some
fact situation not foreseen when the original decision was
handed down. Also, a holding on the narrowest grounds possi-
ble helps to keep the court safely within its own sphere and out
of the legislature's domain.'0
Most of the Bunnell requirements do not seem overbroad
and will probably not cause the court any difficulty in the
future. The requirement that defendant waive his privilege
against self-incrimination, however, does raise potential prob-
47. Id. at 611, 531 P.2d at 1098, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 314.
48. Clearly, all submissions involve waiver of the right to a jury trial as well as
waiver of the right to confront some, if not all, witnesses. Just as obviously, if the
defendant does not plan to present evidence in his defense, he should be made aware
of his right to do so and should waive that right before submission. Finally, the sixth
amendment requires that each defendant be advised of the nature of the charges
against him and the consequences thereof, including possible conviction and its conse-
quences.
49. California courts have inherent and implied powers which are necessary to
their function as a separate department of government. CAL. CONST. art. 6, § 1. The
supreme court, because its decisions are binding on the lower courts, has the ability
to use this power to supervise the business of the courts. For example, in Bunnell the
requirements that a defendant must be advised of certain rights and that waiver of
those rights must appear on the record serves to relieve both trial and appellate courts
of the burden of distinguishing between submissions "tantamount to a plea of guilty"
and submissions in which a defendant contests his guilt. This decision does not grant
defendants rights they do not already possess but rather eases the courts' burden of
assuring that defendants have not been deprived of their rights.
50. The duty of the courts is to construe and apply the law as it is enacted and
not to add thereto or detract therefrom. Pacific Coast Bank v. Roberts, 16 Cal. 2d 800,
805, 108 P.2d 439, 442 (1940).
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lems. When the defendant did not testify at the preliminary
examination, does not reserve the right to testify in the agree-
ment to submit, and does not agree to the submission of any
of his statements, he has not done anything likely to incrimi-
nate himself. Though he should be made aware of the fifth
amendment privilege, a defendant should not be made to waive
that right in order to submit his case.
The court probably did not intend that a defendant be
required to waive rights not necessarily waived by submission
in order to obtain a submission, but such an interpretation of
this particular requirement is certainly possible. Very likely,
the court included the fifth amendment waiver among the
mandatory warnings to avoid problems similar to those engen-
dered by Mosley, in which the trial courts would be forced to
determine whether the terms of a submission entail a waiver
of the privilege. 5' Such a determination is not as difficult as
deciding whether a submission is "tantamount to a plea of
guilty," however. The burden on the courts would seem prefer-
able to requiring a defendant to waive his rights unnecessarily.
The other major conclusion of the court, that submissions
accompanied by a stipulation that conviction may be for no
more than some lesser included offense, may have a substantial
effect on criminal procedure in the future.
In its decision, the Bunnell court almost entirely ignored
the bargain aspects of the submission agreement." Since it is
difficult to imagine that the prosecution spontaneously, and
without the incentive of an offer to submit, decided to decrease
the charge in this case, it is highly probable that submission
was in fact part of a bargain. The bargain elements of submis-
sions, and of this submission in particular, closely parallel the
elements involved in a plea bargain, and those parallel aspects
51. 13 Cal. 3d at 605, 531 P.2d at 1094, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 310.
52. The prosecutor alleged that the submission was a "bargained-for disposition"
of that action and the lower courts apparently accepted this argument. Id. at 601, 531
P.2d at 1091, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 307. The supreme court barely discussed this characteri-
zation of the submission, and then only in a footnote maintaining that, despite its
bargain elements, jeopardy attaches in a submission. Id. at 602 n.4, 531 P.2d at 1092
n.4, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 308 n.4. The jeopardy question really is distinct from the double
jeopardy question, however, since jeopardy pertains only to being at risk, whereas the
interpretation of section 1023 imposes a statutory double jeopardy bar on the prosecu-
tion of offenses for which the defendant has never been at risk. See People v. Greer,
30 Cal. 2d 589, 597, 184 P.2d 512, 517 (1947). Therefore, the fact that jeopardy attaches
in a submission is not sufficient by itself to distinguish the court's interpretation of
bargained-for submissions from plea bargains.
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suggest that the reasoning of Bunnell could be applied to a plea
bargain situation.53
At present most jurisdictions in the United States hold
that double jeopardy and implied acquittal principles do not
apply when a defendant has sought and obtained a reversal of
a conviction which was a result of his decision to plead guilty.54
In that situation, all bargains are off; the defendant is placed
in the same position as if he never had been tried, and the
charge is returned to its original pre-bargain level. California
statutory and case law adopts this treatment of broken plea
bargains.5" However, in Bunnell, when similar bargain ele-
ments were involved, the court held that section 1023 of the
Penal Code applied."
It was not unreasonable for the court to find that submis-
sions are trials for double jeopardy purposes, since guilt must
actually be decided on the merits. 7 If, on the merits, the judge
acquits the defendant or finds him guilty on a lesser included
charge, the doctrine of implied acquittal can be justified on
constitutional and statutory double jeopardy grounds." The
Bunnell decision could easily have been restricted to these situ-
ations only, but it was not. When an artificial ceiling is placed
on the maximum charge which may be considered, a determi-
nation that the defendant is guilty of that specified maximum
charge does not imply that he has been acquitted of the higher
charge removed from consideration on the merits.59 Neverthe-
53. In plea bargaining, the prosecution agrees to lower the charge to some lesser
included offense and the defendant pleads guilty to that charge to avoid the risk of
conviction on a greater charge. Each side gains something. The prosecution avoids
having to bring the case to trial and the defendant avoids a greater penalty. The
bargained-for submission accompanied by a stipulation to decrease the charge to be
considered gives the parties approximately the same thing. This similarity makes the
possible extension of Bunnell to plea bargains logical.
54. See Bishop, Broken Bargains, 50 J. URBAN L. 231 (1972).
55. See CAL. PEN. CODE § 1262 (West 1970) (a reversal of a judgment against
defendant is deemed an order for a new trial); People v. Kirkpatrick, 7 Cal. 3d 480,
487, 498 P.2d 992, 996, 102 Cal. Rptr. 744, 748 (1972); In re Sutherland, 6 Cal. 3d 666,
672, 493 P.2d 857, 861, 100 Cal. Rptr. 129, 133 (1972); In re Gannon, 26 Cal. App. 3d
731, 738-39, 103 Cal. Rptr. 224, 229 (1972).
56. 13 Cal. 3d at 607-08, 531 P.2d at 1096, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 312.
57. See notes 23-27 and accompanying text supra.
58. Since guilt is actually decided on the merits in a submission, if the defendant
was acquitted or found guilty of a lower offense than the maximum possible under the
submission, the judge would have actually had and rejected the opportunity to return
a verdict on the maximum charge. This situation would meet the more stringent
requirements of constitutional implied acquittal as well as the requirements of statu-
tory implied acquittal. See Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. at 328-29.
59. In such a situation the judge might have found facts sufficient to convict on
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less, the court held that section 1023 should apply.
The reasoning of the court, that the prosecution's stipula-
tion to lower the charge to be considered upon submission is a
binding acquittal of any greater charges, easily may be ex-
tended to the plea bargain situation! 0 Admittedly, in future
cases the courts could distinguish between plea bargains and
bargained-for submissions, but given the similarity of the two
procedures, extension of the Bunnell rule to breached plea bar-
gains would seem logical." Such an extension, while not un-
precedented, may not have been foreseen or intended by the
court. 
2
the greater charge which was excluded from consideration, but he was precluded from
returning a verdict on that charge. When a defendant obtains a reversal of his convic-
tion under such circumstances, the rules pertaining to broken plea bargains seem more
applicable. See Bishop, Broken Bargains, 50 J. URBAN L. 231 (1972). If the judge were
required to give the reasons for his verdict, it would be possible to determine when the
verdict actually acquitted defendant of the greater excluded charge and when the
bargain alone prevented conviction on that charge.
60. See note 59 supra.
61. The court left several possible alternatives for distinguishing between
Bunnell and other submissions or plea bargain cases. First, it may distinguish between
submissions and plea bargains generally, since guilt is decided on the merits in a
submission and is admitted in a plea bargain. See notes 23-27 and accompanying text
supra. Second, the court may limit its holding in Bunnell to cases in which the facts
would not justify conviction on the greater excluded charge. See note 59 supra.
Finally, the court in Bunnell noted that the court of appeal in that case could have
reversed petitioner's conviction on a more narrow ground, but instead held that peti-
tioner did not receive a fair trial. "Implicit in that holding is a conclusion that the
proceeding did constitute a trial." 13 Cal. 3d at 600, 531 P.2d at 1091, 119 Cal. Rptr.
at 307. The court went on to comment that the prosecution did not seek review of that
decision, that the ruling became final, and that "the subsequent proceedings which
are the subject of the instant petition must be considered in light of that ruling." Id.
See People v. Durbin, 64 Cal. 2d 474, 413 P.2d 433, 50 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1966). Though
the supreme court independently found that a submission is a trial, the language
quoted could be used to distinguish Bunnell from all other submissions and plea
bargains as compelled by the lower court's determination that that particular submis-
sion was a trial.
62. See Rivers v. Lucas, 477 F.2d 199 (6th Cir. 1973), noted in 7 IND. L.J. 761
(1974). In Rivers, the Sixth Circuit held that a plea bargain, when the conviction upon
that bargain is reversed, impliedly acquitted the defendant of greater charges based
on the same facts. The court there gave two reasons for this determination: a theory
of estoppel against the state, that "there is implicit in a court's acceptance of a plea
to a lesser included offense a determination that the right to prosecute the defendant
on the more serious charge has been relinquished"; and a theory of implied considera-
tion, that the judge, in accepting the bargain, had examined the evidence and im-
pliedly acquitted the defendant of the greater charge. 477 F.2d at 202.
California courts need not adopt such tortured reasoning in order to reach the
same conclusion. Section 1023 does not require actual jeopardy to attach in order for
implied acquittal to operate. With the extension of section 1023 to bargained-for sub-
missions, the further extension of that section to plea bargains is made easy.
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In the future the court will undoubtedly have to deal with
an attempted extension. Should the court decide not to distin-
guish or overrule the double jeopardy holding of Bunnell, but
to extend its reasoning to the plea bargain situation, the func-
tion of plea bargains in California criminal law could be sub-
stantially altered. The prosecution would be absolutely bound
by its decision to bargain, regardless of the subsequent actions
of the defendant. As a consequence, decisions to bargain would
have to be more carefully made.
Perhaps an extension of Bunnell to plea bargains, or the
threat of extension with its concomitant effect on the decision
to bargain, was precisely what the court intended. In any event,
until the issue is decided, prosecutors should be prepared to
abide by any stipulation they might make regarding the charge
to which the defendant will be subjected, come what may.
Paula A. Johnson
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PRISONERS' RIGHT TO MU-
TUAL ASSISTANCE AND REASONABLE ACCESS TO
THE COURTS-Brown v. Pitchess, 13 Cal. 3d 518, 531 P.2d
772, 119 Cal. Rptr. 204 (1975).
A Los Angeles County Jail regulation prohibited unsent-
enced "pro per" inmates from giving legal assistance to sent-
enced inmates.' Only pro pers were allowed to use the jail law
library; sentenced inmates were not given access to the library
at any time.' Three unsentenced pro per inmates brought an
action on behalf of themselves and all other unsentenced in-
mates seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under the
Federal Civil Rights Act,3 on the ground that the jail regulation
against mutual assistance restricted the prisoners' right of
"reasonable access to the courts"' in securing post-conviction
relief as guaranteed by the Constitution. The pro per inmates
also complained of the inadequacy of the jail law library and
other conditions of confinement.
1. The regulations governing "pro per" inmates derived from a document pre-
sented at the trial level as "the Los Angeles Superior Court Memorandum Re Inmate
Pro Per Privileges . .. [which] clearly prohibits 'pro per' prisoners from assisting
other prisoners in legal matters." Brown v. Pitchess, 112 Cal. Rptr. 350, 352 (Ct. App.
1974).
CAL. DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS R. DR-2602 (1973) (emphasis added) provides:
You may assist other inmates with legal work or have legal materials of
other inmates in your possession, except as prohibited by the institu-
tional regulations.
"Pro per" is a commonly used abbreviation for the Latin phrase in propria
persona-literally, in one's own proper person-describing a party who appears in
court to conduct his case without the aid of an attorney. See BLACK's LAW DiCTIONARY
899 (4th rev. ed. 1968).
2. Brown v. Pitchess, 13 Cal. 3d 518, at 518, 531 P.2d 772, at 772, 119 Cal. Rptr.
204, at 204 (1975).
3. Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regula-
tion, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immun-
ities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
4. "Reasonable access to the courts is . .. a right [secured by the
Constitution and laws of the United States], being guaranteed as against
state action by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. In
so far as access by state prisoners to federal court is concerned, this right
was recognized in Ex Parte Hull . . . .The right of access by state
prisoners to state courts was recognized in White v. Ragen ... .
Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 498 n.24 (1969) (citations omitted), quoting Hatfield
v. Bailleaux, 290 F.2d 632, 636 (9th Cir. 1961).
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The superior court granted preliminary injunctions order-
ing defendants to add United States Law Week and the Los
Angeles Daily Journal to the jail law library and to employ a
fulltime attorney to assist sentenced inmates in preparing peti-
tions challenging the legality of their confinement. The defen-
dants appealed. The Supreme Court of California affirmed the
preliminary injunctions, but vacated the order requiring a full-
time attorney upon condition that the defendant comply with
a federal court order to make the law library available to sent-
enced inmates. The supreme court held that as long as no
reasonable alternative to inmate assistance existed, the state
could not prohibit or unreasonably restrict any form of legal
assistance from one inmate to another.
The court dealt first with a threshold jurisdictional issue
raised initially at the appellate level: whether a California state
court had concurrent jurisdiction with federal district court to
enforce rights under the Federal Civil Rights Act.5 Defendants
contended that the inmates' action brought pursuant to section
1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1970 sought an exclusively fed-
eral remedy and thus could be heard only in federal court. The
court was quick to point out that the "original jurisdiction"
conferred on federal district courts in civil rights actions is not
the equivalent of exclusive jurisdiction.' Support for this inter-
pretation is embedded deeply in our legal system.7 Unless juris-
diction is excluded by express provision or by necessary impli-
cation, state courts not only have concurrent jurisdiction with
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970) provides in pertinent part:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
authorized by law to be commenced by any person:
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, stat-
ute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or
immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act
of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within
the jurisdiction of the United States . ..
6. Brown v. Pitchess, 13 Cal. 3d 518, 521, 531 P.2d 772, 774, 119 Cal. Rptr. 204,
206 (1975).
7. Justice Bradley stated in 1876:
The general question whether state courts can exercise concurrent juris-
diction with the Federal courts in cases arising under the Constitution,
laws, and treaties of the United States, has been elaborately discussed,
. . . but the result of these discussions has, in our judgment, been . ..
to affirm jurisdiction, where it is not excluded by express provision, or
by incompatibility in its exercise arising from the nature of the particular
case.
Claflin v. Housman, 93 U.S. 130, 136 (1876).
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federal courts to enforce civil rights, but the "existence of juris-
diction creates the duty to exercise it."' Thus the Act did not
relieve the states of their duty to protect the civil rights of their
respective citizens, but merely added federal power where
those "representing a state in some capacity were unable or
unwilling to enforce a state law."'
On the legal assistance issue, the Brown court determined
that although the plaintiffs were pro per inmates complaining
8. Gerry of Cal. v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 2d 118, 122, 194 P.2d 689, 692 (1948);
accord, Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947); International Prisoners Union v. Rizzo, 356
F. Supp. 806 (E.D. Pa. 1973); see U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
Failure by a state, whether "by reason of prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance
or otherwise" to enforce a right guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment was the
central concern of the 42nd Congress when it originally drafted the Civil Rights Act of
1871 to supplement state action with federal action. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180
(1961).
Any analysis of the purposes and scope of § 1983 must take cogniz-
ance of the events and passions of the time at which it was enacted. After
the Civil War ended in 1865, race relations in the South became increas-
ingly turbulent. The Ku Klux Klan was organized by southern whites in
1866, and a wave of murders and assaults was launched against both
blacks and Union sympathizers. Thus, at the opening of the 42nd Con-
gress, considerable apprehension was expressed by Republicans about the
insecurity of life and property in the south, and on March 23, 1871,
President Grant sent a message to Congress requesting additional federal
legislation to curb this rising tide of violence. Such legislation was
deemed essential in light of the inability of the state governments to
control the situation. Five days later, Congressman Shellabarger of Ohio
introduced the bill that was eventually to become the Ku Klux Klan Act
of 1871.
District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 425-26 (1973) (footnotes omitted).
9. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 176 (1961) (emphasis in original).
The California Supreme Court recently reemphasized the role of the state courts
as protectors of section 1983 civil rights actions in its holding in Williams v. Horvath,
16 Cal. 3d 834, 548 P.2d 1125, 129 Cal. Rptr. 453 (1976). The court held that although
the California Tort Claims Act, CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 810-996.6 (West 1966), required a
suit to be brought against a public employee within 100 days of the cause of action,
the Act could not bar a section 1983 claim against a police officer as long as the claim
met the federal statute of limitations. Since, in California, federal district courts have
adopted a three-year statute of limitations with respect to civil rights claims-by
applying the analogous California statute, CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE § 338(1) (1954), specify-
ing a three-year limitation for an action upon a liability created by statute-plaintiffs
could have brought their action against the police officer anytime within three years
of its accrual. "While the [specific] civil disorders of the . . . 19th century, which
induced passage of the Civil Rights Act, are no longer significant . .. . the purposes
of section 1983 . . . must still be served,'and may not be frustrated by state substan-
tive limitations couched in procedural language." Id. at 841, 548 P.2d at 457-58, 129
Cal. Rptr. at 1129-30 (citations omitted).
The Brown decision, leaves little doubt that section 1983 creates a statutory sub-
stantive right which must be enforced equally by state and federal courts. 13 Cal. 3d
at 522, 531 P.2d at 775, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 207.
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about the prohibition against giving legal assistance, the para-
mount consideration was the sentenced inmates' need to
receive assistance. Since only unsentenced pro pers-who were
segregated from the sentenced prisoners''-could use the law
library, the court found denial of assistance from pro pers
"tended to deny [sentenced inmates] access to the courts.""
It is important to note the prison regulation did not pre-
vent sentenced inmates from giving legal assistance to other
sentenced inmates; it prohibited aid from unsentenced pro
pers. In finding this restriction unreasonable, the court relied
on the 1969 U.S. Supreme Court decision of Johnson v. Avery"
and a 1970 California Supreme Court case, In re Harrell." In
Johnson, the petitioner, a state prisoner, was placed in discipli-
nary confinement for violating a prison regulation preventing
inmates from giving each other legal assistance. On certiorari,
Justice Fortas, speaking for seven members of the Court, held
that unless and until the state made available some reasonable
alternative method of aiding inmates in the preparation of
post-conviction petitions, it could not validly enforce the regu-
lation barring inmates from assisting each other.
In Harrell, the challenged rule stated that all briefs, peti-
tions and other legal papers had to remain in the possession of
the inmate to whom they pertained. The rule, like the Brown
regulation, did not prohibit mutual inmate assistance, but se-
verely restricted it. The court upheld the right of prison author-
ities reasonably to regulate the practice of giving legal assis-
tance. Such regulations as limiting the number of books a pris-
oner could have in his cell at one time, 4 or limiting the time
and place for prisoner work on peitions"5 were cited as reasona-
ble. But, the court said, since the assistance most often sought
was the actual drafting of an application for relief, it was im-
possible for one inmate to write a draft of an application for
10. CAL. PEN. CODE § 4001 (West 1970) provides in part:
Each county jail must contain a sufficient number of rooms to allow
all persons to either one of the following classes to be confined separately
and distinctly to either of the other classes:
1. Persons committed on criminal process and detained for trial;
2. Persons already convicted of crime and held under sentence
11. 13 Cal. 3d at 526, 531 P.2d at 777, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 209.
12. 393 U.S. 483, 490 (1969).
13. 2 Cal. 3d 675, 470 P.2d 640, 87 Cal. Rptr. 504 (1970).
14. Id. at 690, 470 P.2d at 649, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 513.
15. Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F.2d 632, 638 (9th Cir. 1961).
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another without violating the ban against "possessing" that
person's legal papers. 6 The fact that the prison rule had a
"severe effect upon the ability of an illiterate or uneducated
prisoner to gain assistance from a more gifted one"' 7 did not
ipso facto require the court to declare it invalid, since it did not
proscribe mutual assistance; but, the Harrell court cautioned,
determining the validity of a particular regulation involves bal-
ancing the scope of the restriction against the purpose it serves.
If the restriction is significant, the justification must be corre-
spondingly great; if the restriction merely inconveniences pris-
oners seeking legal assistance and the institution can show a
clear reason for its existence, the rule will be upheld.'8 The
state failed to meet the heavy burden of justification in Harrell,
so the prison regulation was struck down.
The sentenced inmates in Brown, as in Harrell, were kept
separate from unsentenced inmates in the interest of security.',
What made the Brown restriction unreasonable was the addi-
tional fact that the sentenced inmates had no access to the
library. The court made it plain that no prisoner had the right
to assistance from a lawyer or even from a pro per: "Johnson
and Harrell are satisfied if inmates with intellectual or educa-
tional handicaps can receive legal assistance from inmates
without such handicaps."2 Consequently, once the library was
made accessible to sentenced inmates, who were not prevented
from helping one another, the court was satisfied. The inconve-
nience of not being able to receive assistance from a pro per
would not outweigh the institution's policy of keeping sent-
enced and unsentenced inmates separate.
Compliance with the court order opening the library left
the sentenced inmates in an unfortunate position. Previously,
they had the assistance of a fulltime attorney; after the deci-
sion, they were left once again to themselves. It is impossible
to see how the court can determine that inmate assistance is
an adequate substitute for professional legal aid. There is evi-
dence that strongly suggests the inmate population may simply
16. 2 Cal. 3d at 687, 470 P.2d at 647, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 511.
17. Id. at 687, 470 P.2d at 646, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 510.
18. Id. at 686, 470 P.2d at 646, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 510.
19. The court cited California Penal Code section 4001. See note 10 supra. The
greater access of unsentenced inmates to contraband was given as a reason in support
of segregation from sentenced inmates. 13 Cal. 3d at 525, 531 P.2d at 777, 119 Cal.
Rptr. at 209.
20. Id. at 526, 531 P.2d at 778, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 210.
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be unable to provide mutual assistance effective enough to
insure access to the courts for post-conviction relief.
Although the average citizen has a high school education,
the average inmate has been in school for only eight years.2
The United States Bureau of Prisons reported that of the 51.7
percent of all federal inmates who claim to have completed
more than eight years of schooling, only 24.6 percent possessed
skills above the eighth grade level, according to tests given in
the institutions.22 The Supreme Court acknowledged in
Johnson that "jails and penitentiaries include among their
inmates a high percentage of persons who are totally or func-
tionally illiterate . ". .. I' One prisoner wrote:
When a prisoner first attempts to utilize post convic-
tion remedies to attack his conviction, he views his case
subjectively. In many instances this prevents him from
bringing his case to a successful conclusion. The subjective
viewpoint distorts the prisoner's conception of the perti-
nent facts; he is unable to identify the facts that are re-
quired to establish a prima facie violation of his rights.24
The same prisoner asserted that there are only a "handful" of
writ-writers in the state prisons capable of drafting proper
pleadings for remedies other than habeas corpus.25 Add to this
the fact that law libraries are often hopelessly out of date,2" and
it is small wonder that 98 percent of inmate applications for
relief are classed by courts as "frivolous." 27 Yet the number of
these prisoner petitions continues to skyrocket and clog our
already overburdened court system.28
The Brown court conceded the connection between lack of
21. Jacob & Sharma, Justice After Trial: Prisoners' Need for Legal Services in
the Criminal-Correctional Process, 18 KAN. L. REV. 493, 508 (1970) [hereinafter cited
as Jacob & Sharma, Justice After Trial], citing UNITED STATES DEP'T OF COMMERCE
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 113 (1966) and
Note, Constitutional Law: Prison "No-Assistance" Regulation and the Jailhouse
Lawyer, 1968 Duke L.J. 343, 347-48 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Note, Jailhouse
Lawyer].
22. Jacob & Sharma, Justice After Trial, supra note 21, at 508 n.92, citing Note,
Jailhouse Lawyer, supra note 21, at 360-61. For example, prisoners in North Carolina
claim 8.33 years median education, but educational achievement tests show 4.57 years.
23. 393 U.S. 483, 487 (1969).
24. Larsen, A Prisoner Looks at Writ-Writing, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 343, 351 (1968).
25. Id. at 360-61.
26. Id. at 353-54 n.24.
27. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 445 (1963) (dissenting opinion).
28. Id. at 446-47; Jacob & Sharma, Justice After Trial, supra note 21, at 496-98.
See generally Note, Jailhouse Lawyer, supra note 21.
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assistance and denial of the fundamental right of access to the
courts. Yet, the court refused to deal with what minimum
standard of quality the assistance rendered must meet.
Whether inmate assistance is generally of such poor quality
and of such little use that it could be the constructive equiva-
lent of no assistance at all, is a question not answered by
Brown. Since 60 percent of the defendants in all felony or seri-
ous criminal cases are financially unable to retain counsel, 9
there is a further question whether such indigent defendants,
unable to afford the competent assistance available to their
wealthier counterparts, are deprived of equal access to the
courts.
Ironically, the Brown court considers the sufficiency of the
law library but not the sufficiency of the assistance available
from the inmate population. Justice White, with whom Justice
Black joined, dissented in the Johnson case:
Habeas corpus petitions, as the majority notes, are
relatively easy to prepare: they need only set out the facts
giving rise to a claim for relief and the judge will apply the
law, appointing a lawyer for the prisoner and giving him a
hearing when appropriate. . . .To the extent that it is
easy to state a claim, any prisoner can do it, and need not
submit to the mercies of a jailhouse lawyer. To the extent
that it is difficult-and it is necessary to understand what
one's rights are before it is possible to set out in a petition
the facts which support them-there may be no fellow pris-
oner adequate to the task. . . .They need help, but I
doubt that the problem of the indigent convict will be
solved by subjecting him to the false hopes, dominance,
and inept representation of the average unsupervised jail-
house lawyer.3 0
The notion that a prisoner forfeited all rights upon conviction
is slowly dying.3 "There is no iron curtain drawn between the
Constitution and the prisons of this country," the Supreme
Court said recently.2 Prisoners have been given religious free-
29. Jacob & Sharma, Justice After Trial, supra note 21, at 509, citing REPORT OF
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 18 (1963).
30. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 500-01 (1969).
31. See, e.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 2600 (West 1970); Comment, Civil Death in
California: A Concept Overdue for Its Grave, 15 SANTA CLARA LAW. 427, 433 n.35 (1975);
Comment, The Right of Expression in Prison, 40 S. CAL. L. REV. 407 (1967); Note,
Judicial Intervention in Prison Administration, 9 WM. & MARY L. REV. 178 (1967).
32. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974).
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dom under the first and fourteenth amendments to the Consti-
tution. They have the right of access to the courts. They also
are protected under the Equal Protection Clause of the four-
teenth amendment from discrimination on the basis of race,
and they may not be deprived of life, liberty or property with-
out due process of law.33 However, the indigent prisoner seeking
post-conviction relief today stands in a position similar to that
of the indigent appellant in 1962, before the Douglas v.
California"4 decision provided him with the right to counsel on
the first appeal-as-of-right. The words in the Douglas opinion
have meaning here:
There is lacking that equality demanded by the Four-
teenth Amendment where the rich man, who appeals as of
right, enjoys the benefit of counsel's examination into the
record, research of the law, and marshalling of arguments
on his behalf, while the indigent, already burdened by apreliminary determination that his case is without merit,
is forced to shift for himself. the indigent, where the re-
cord is unclear or the errors are hidden, has only the right
to a meaningless ritual, while the rich man has a meaning-
ful appeal. 5
The answer, to some commentators,38 lies in the appointment
of a public defender expert at handling appeals from criminal
convictions, who can examine prisoner complaints and file col-
lateral attacks. Instead of burdening the courts with poorly
prepared writs, prisoners would have the objective advice of
counsel, who would provide all prisoners with a minimum level
of competent assistance. Other states have experimented with
the appointment of law students as legal interns to help the
inmate population."7 At least one court has expressed the opin-
ion that effective assistance is more likely to be assured if it is
attended to by the "bench, bar and law schools" rather than
left to the ad hoc procedures of the lower courts.38
For the indigent, uneducated prisoner who may be entitled
to post-conviction relief, an appointed counsel would mean the
33. Id. at 556.
34. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
35. Id. at 357-58.
36. Krause, A Lawyer Looks At Writ-Writing, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 371, 377 (1968).
37. See, e.g., Kimball, Correctional Internships-A Wisconsin Experiment in
Education for Professional Responsibility, 18 J. LEGAL EDUC. 86 (1965); Note, Jailhouse
Lawyer, supra note 21, at 345 n.12 (1968).
38. Johnson v. Avery, 382 F.2d 353, 357 (6th Cir. 1967), aff'd, 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
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end to assistance by chance and a guarantee of equal protection
under the law in gaining access to the courts. If the right to
assistance is as important in gaining access to justice as the
Brown court would have us believe, it is unthinkable that such
a right should receive such scant protection.
William C. Haggerty
CRIMINAL LAW-DISCLOSURE OF INFORMANT'S
IDENTITY COMPELLED EVEN THOUGH INFORMANT
NOT INVOLVED WITH, NOR PRESENT DURING OF-
FENSE-Bowens v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. App. 3d 127, 120
Cal. Rptr. 474 (1975).
On November 30, 1973, a confidential informant intro-
duced a man known as "Fat Robert" to Oakland undercover
officer Raymond Clark. After completing the introduction, the
informant departed. Officer Clark then purchased some illegal
narcotics from "Fat Robert."' Six weeks later, at the same
location, Officer Clark purchased narcotics from the same indi-
vidual. The informant was one of six or seven other persons
present in the room. It is not certain whether the informant
actually witnessed the transaction.2 Officer Clark met "Fat
Robert" one week later and again purchased from him a quan-
tity of narcotics. The informant was neither present during,
nor involved with, this transaction.' Subsequently, a complaint
was filed charging the defendant, Robert Bowens, with a single
count of violating Health and Safety Code section 11352.' The
charge was based on the one transaction involving only "Fat
Robert" and the officer.5
At the trial, Officer Clark described the sale and testified
that he believed Robert Bowens to be "Fat Robert." The de-
fense established that Clark had made over 100 purchases of
illicit drugs from more than 50 different individuals during the
six-month period in which the purchases from "Fat Robert"
were made.' Pursuant to a defense of mistaken identification,
defense counsel then sought to compel disclosure of the inform-
ant's identity on the ground that the informant's testimony
1. Bowens v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. App. 3d 127, 129, 120 Cal. Rptr. 474, 475
(1975).
2. Id.
3. Id. The court observed in a footnote that the defense of mistaken identity
would not have been available, and consequently neither would the motion for disclo-
sure of the informer's identity, if the arrest had been made at this time while "Fat
Robert" actually had the narcotics on his person. Id. at n.1.
4. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11352 (West 1970), which prohibits the sale of
a controlled substance.
5. 47 Cal. App. 3d at 129, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 475.
6. Id. at 130, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 475.
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could conceivably exonerate the defendant.' The motion was
denied.'
The defendant sought a writ of mandate, which was denied
by the court of appeal. Bowens then appealed to the California
Supreme Court. A hearing was granted,' and six days later the
supreme court transferred the case to the court of appeal with
directions to order an alternative writ of mandate.'"
Traditionally, a governmental entity has been permitted
to withhold the identity of a confidential informant" unless, in
a criminal case, nondisclosure jeopardizes the defendant's
sixth amendment right to a fair trial." The United States Su-
preme Court enunciated the basic guidelines for resolving such
conflicts in People v. Roviaro.'3 In Roviaro, the Court stated
that the government's privilege to withhold an informer's
identity must give way to the defendant's right to a fair trial
whenever the knowledge of the informer's identity is necessary
to the preparation of the defense.'4 Emphasizing that no fixed
rule would be adequate, '" the Court held that the public inter-
est in protecting the confidentiality of sources and safeguarding
the well-being of the informer must be balanced on a case-by-
case basis against the relevance of the information to the prep-
aration of the defense and other factors.'0
7. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1041(a) (West 1966) which provides in pertinent part:
Except as provided in this section, a public entity has a privilege to refuse
to disclose the identity of a person who has furnished information [to a
law enforcement officer] purporting to disclose a violation of a law . . .
and to prevent another from disclosing such identity, if the privilege is
claimed by a person authorized by the public entity to do so and. . . (2)
Disclosure of the identity of the informer is against the public interest
because there is a necessity for preserving the confidentiality of his ident-
ity that outweighs the necessity for disclosure in the interest of justice
8. 47 Cal. App. 3d at 129, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 475.
9. Id. at 128, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 475.
10. Id. at 129, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 475.
11. See, e.g., United States v. Schneiderman, 104 F. Supp. 405 (S.D. Cal. 1952).
12. See, e.g., United States v. Conforti, 200 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1953); cf. Scher
v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938). See also 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 332
(1965); 15 AM. JuR. P.O.F. Confidential Informant 332 (1971); 18 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal
Law § 964 (1975); 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 954(b) (1961) (The public policy favoring
nondisclosure of informers forbids only nonessential disclosure, and disclosure may be
compelled when essential to the defense); Berger, Executive Privilege v. Congressional
Inquiry, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 1288, 1300 (1965).
13. People v. Roviaro, 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
14. Id. at 60-61.
15. Id. at 62.
16. Id.
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California has embodied the confidential informant'sprivilege in Evidence Code section 1041.17 The California Su-
preme Court's primary interpretation of that section is found
in People v. Williams,"1 wherein the court held that the privi-
lege of non-disclosure must necessarily give way whenever it
comes into conflict with the "fundamental principle that a
person accused of a crime is entitled to a full and fair opportun-
ity to defend himself."'" The court found that this principle is
violated when concealment of the informant's identity results
in the withholding of information material to the defense.2 0
Thus, in California, when disclosure is sought the only issue for
adjudication is whether the informer's identity is material in
that particular case.2'
The Bowens court held that the informant's identity was
material to Bowens' defense of mistaken identity even though
the informant was neither involved in nor present during the
commission of the charged offense. The result is an expansion
of the basis of liability set forth in the Williams line of cases.2
The court of appeal reasoned that since the informer's
original introduction was the event which brought the officer
and defendant together, the informer might be able to testify
that Bowens was not the person he had introduced to Clark.23
The possibility that the informer could undermine Clark's
identifying testimony and exonerate Bowens was found to be
sufficiently material to the defendant's case to require either
disclosure of the informant's identity or, if the prosecution
17. CAL. EvID. CODE § 1041 (West 1966). See note 7 supra.
18. People v. Williams, 51 Cal. 2d 355, 333 P.2d 19 (1958).
19. Id. at 357, 333 P.2d at 20 (emphasis added).
20. Id. at 358, 333 P.2d at 21.
21. For a discussion of the status of the confidential informant's privilege in
California after the Williams line of cases, see Comment, Non-Disclosure of the In-formant's Identity, 1 PAC. L.J. 610 (1970); Note, Identification of Informer in Narcotic
Sale Prosecution, 33 S. CAL. L. REV. 344 (1960); Comment, Disclosure of Informers, 12
STAN. L. REV. 256 (1959); Comment, Limitations on the Use of Informers, 3 U.S.F.L.
REV. 187 (1968).
The types of situations that the Williams court considered material include those
in which the informer participated in the crime, was an eyewitness, or gave information
leading to a warrantless search. 51 Cal. 2d at 358-59, 333 P.2d at 21 (citations omitted).
22. Bowens v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. App. 3d 127, 133, 120 Cal. Rptr. 474, 477
(1975).
23. Id.
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chose not to identify him, dismissal of the case.2" The opinion
relied heavily on Williams"' and People v. Durazo.6
Williams involved a sale of narcotics shortly after the de-
fendant and a police officer were introduced by an informer.
The original sale occurred out of the presence of the informer.27
Shortly thereafter the officer made another purchase, 0 and the
defendant was subsequently convicted of both sales. 9 Both
convictions were reversed by the California Supreme Court
because the trial court had refused to compel disclosure of the
informant's identity. The Williams court reasoned that a con-
tradiction by the informer of the officer's identification as to
the first sale would be material to a defense of mistaken ident-
ity on both counts."
The Durazo case involved three counts of narcotics trans-
actions, with the informant present only at the first sale. 2 De-
fendant's convictions on all of the counts were reversed by the
supreme court.13 The court noted that the arresting officer tes-
tified that he had no doubt the same person had made all three
sales.34 Consequently, contradictory testimony by the informer,
who was present at the initial sale, would weigh very heavily
for a defense of mistaken identity."
The Bowens court had affirmed the original conviction.:"
On remand, however, it found the parallel between the Bowens
facts and those of Williams and Durazo "inescapably clear,"
24. Id.
25. People v. Williams, 51 Cal. 2d 355, 333 P.2d 19 (1958)..
26. People v. Durazo, 52 Cal. 2d 354, 340 P.2d 594 (1959); Annot., 76 A.L.R.2d
257 (1959).
27. 51 Cal. 2d at 357, 333 P.2d at 20.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 356, 333 P.2d at 20.
30. Id. at 360, 333 P.2d at 22.
31. Id.
32. 52 Cal. 2d at 356, 340 P.2d at 595.
33. Id. at 357, 340 P.2d at 596.
34. Id. at 356, 340 P.2d at 596.
35. Justice Shenck dissented vigorously, observing that once an informer took
part in an officer-offender relationship, that offender was forever immune to prosecu-
tion absent a revelation of the informer's identity, regardless of the number of indepen-
dent meetings between the officer and the offender, or any other factors affecting the
reliability of the officer's identification. 52 Cal. 2d at 359, 340 P.2d at 597. Justice
Shenck further stated that the case "goes far beyond what is necessary to protect the
rights of the defendant, and adds one more unnecessary impediment in the enforce-
ment of the narcotics laws of this state." Id. at 357, 340 P.2d at 596.
36. 47 Cal. App. 3d at 128, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 475. This tacit resistance to further
extension of the Williams and Durazo doctrine was certainly not the first opposition
that the doctrine received. As previously stated, Justice Shenck wrote a strong dissent
in Durazo. See note 35 supra.
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despite the fact that the informers in the earlier cases, unlike
the Bowens informer, had been involved in at least one of the
transactions with which the defendant was charged. 7 The
court conceded that withholding the informant's identity is
permissible "when he is not a material witness on the issue of
guilt and his role is merely limited to the disclosure of informa-
tion . . . tending to point the finger of suspicion,"3 but denied
that this situation obtained in Bowens.35 The prosecution's
characterization of a "non-participating non-eyewitness in-
former"' " was, rejected on the ground that he actually had wit-
nessed the first sale and was present in the room at the time
of the second. Moreover, the court declared, disclosure of the
identity of a non-participating, non-eyewitness informer might
still be required if there were other circumstances which made
the identity material to the defense. 4'
The "reasonable possibility" that the Bowens informant
could provide material evidence on the issue of guilt was en-
hanced by the fact that Officer Clark has made over 100 nar-
cotics purchases near the time that the particular transaction
with Bowens was alleged to have occurred. Three or four of
Judge Stephens added his voice in dissent in People v. Long, 42 Cal. App. 3d 751,
758, 17 Cal. Rptr. 200, 205 (1974) (dissenting opinion). Judge Stephens stated that the
informer's identity could be held material in that case only by "gossamer logic."
37. 47 Cal. App. 3d at 132, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 477. The Durazo prosecutor had
dropped the charges for the transaction where the informer was present. 52 Cal. 2d at
356, 340 P.2d at 595.
38. 47 Cal. App. 3d at 132-33, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 477.
39. Id. The Bowens court found that where a reasonable possibility of exonera-
tion exists, withholding the informer's identity would act to deny a fair trial to the
defendant, citing Honore v. Superior Court, 70 Cal. 2d. 162, 449 P.2d 169, 74 Cal. Rptr.
233 (1969), which held that the defendant's burden of demonstrating materiality is met
when it is shown that there is a reasonable possibility that the informant could give
evidence which might result in the defendant's exoneration.
40. 47 Cal. App. 3d at 133, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 477. The court also emphasized that
materiality was not precluded by a finding that the informer was a non-participating,
non-eyewitness.
The court cited People v. Garcia, 67 Cal. 2d 830, 434 P.2d 366, 64 Cal. Rptr. 110
(1967), which held that informants' identities were material even though they were
non-participating and not eyewitnesses because their testimony could put the total
blame on Garcia's co-defendants and consequently exonerate him.
The court also'relied on People v. McShann, 50 Cal. 2d 802, 330 P.2d 33 (1956),
wherein the identity of an informer who allegedly had made a telephone call was
deemed material when the prosecution introduced evidence of the call to corroborate
the arresting officer's testimony as to the defendant's possession of heroin,even though
the informer neither participated in the offense, nor was present when it was commit-
ted.
41. Id. at 132-33, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 477, citing People v. McCoy, 13 Cal. App. 3d
6, 91 Cal. Rptr. 357 (1970), wherein a dismissal for non-disclosure was reversed and
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these took place at the same location as those involving "Fat
Robert."42 Combined with the lengthy period of time between
the transactions and the actual in-court identification of
Bowens,43 this large number of purchases created a reasonable
doubt as to the reliability of the officer's testimony and thus
increased the prospective value of the information sought.4
The court dismissed as irrelevant the fact that in both
Williams and Durazo the informers had been associated with
at least one of the transactions charged.45 Stating that the
"distinction, if it be one, has nothing to do with the principle
involved," the court ruled that the prosecution should not be
able to shield an informer by disregarding earlier offenses and
charging the defendant only with those not involving the in-
former.4"
The court acknowledged that its decision might hamper
law enforcement:
We are not unaware of the alarming increase in nar-
cotic felony violations, or of the hazardous role of an in-
former. But in the balancing process, the right of an indi-
vidual charged with a crime to a fair trial and to properly
prepare his defense is deemed of paramount importance
under the law of this state.47
The Bowens holding appears to have reduced the degree
of materiality that a defendant must show to be entitled to
disclosure of an informant's identity. It appears that once an
informant is involved in the relationship between a narcotics
officer and an offender, and certainly if the informant is the one
who introduced them, then the disclosure of the informant's
identity may be required to support a defense of mistaken
identity no matter how many independent transactions may
have occurred. A defendant in a criminal narcotics action,
the informer's identity was held not to be material where he had only visited the
premises and informed the authorities of the illegal activities that he had seen there.
42. Id.
43. Id. A total of nearly seven months passed between the occurrence of the
offense and the subsequent in-court identification.
44. Id.
45. The information charged only the last of the three transactions, which oc-
curred with only the officer and the offender present. The prosecution's case was not
dependent on the first two transactions where the informer was more intimately in-
volved. Id. at 133, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 477. It seems very likely that this was a conscious
effort by the prosecutors to circumvent Williams and Durazo by removing the informer
almost entirely from the offense charged. Apparently the courts are not going to allow
such techniques to succeed.
46. Id. at 133, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 478.
47. Id.
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knowing that an informer was involved at some point, may
demand that the prosecution identify him. The state is then
placed in the uncomfortable positon of identifying the in-
former, thereby ending his usefulness to the police and poten-
tially jeopardizing his personal safety, or, alternatively, dis-
missing the case.48
A demand for disclosure, however, entails some risk for the
defendant. The prosecution, willing originally to charge only
those offenses not involving the informer, may instead elect to
charge the defendant with all known transactions. The danger
would be particularly acute if there were a number of pending
cases which involved the same informer; the prosecution might
prefer to reveal the informer's identity, allow him to testify,
and pursue the maximum number of convictions in each case.
Under those circumstances a defendant might find himself fac-
ing a much heavier sentence than he would have received had
he not elected to compel disclosure.
The Bowens decision and prior cases in the Williams line
indicate that in the process of achieving the "balance" required
by Roviaro,45 California courts have placed a heavy thumb on
the defendant's side of the scale.'" It appears that less and less
is required to reach the threshold of "materiality" and that
countervailing factors are to be given negligible weight.', As the
concept of materiality becomes more and more attenuated, it
is reasonable to expect that the usefulness of informers will be
greatly decreased and, at least in investigations where inform-
48. Disclosure of the identity of an informer may be a great detriment to the
police by putting suspects on guard in future cases. Also the informer may object
strongly to disclosure and threaten refusal to testify if his identity is revealed, or he
may flee the territory, which would not be unlikely in view of the short life expectancy
of exposed informers. For a discussion of the methods of establishing a defendant's case
for compelling disclosure, see 15 AM. JUR. P.O.F., Confidential Informants § 3, at 355
(1964).
49. People v. Roviaro, 353 U.S. 53, 62 (1957).
50. The California Supreme Court recently stated, in a case where an eyewitness
informer's identity was required to be disclosed, that a balancing process is the proper
procedure in disclosure cases. People v. Goliday, 8 Cal. 3d 771, 505 P.2d 537, 106 Cal.
Rptr. 113 (1973). However, no evidence of actual balancing is found in the opinion.
51. E.g., the California Supreme Court has stated in absolute terms that the
balance favors the defendant whenever the informer's identity is material to the
defense. People v. Goliday, 8 Cal. 3d 771, 777, 505 P.2d 537, 542, 106 Cal. Rptr. 113,
118 (1973).
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ers are relied upon, the effectiveness of law enforcement in
California will be reduced."
Michael J. Hughes
52. An absolute "materiality" standard ignores factors which might make disclo-
sure an injustice to society: e.g., when the informer's life has been publicly threatened;
when the arresting officer has had many meetings with the offender in which the
informer was not a participant; or when independent evidence of the offender's iden-
tity, such as fingerprints or photographs, are available. While courts may possibly
evaluate these factors during a determination of materiality, it is not clear from a
reading of the decisions that this has been done.
COMMUNITY PROPERTY-FOR APPORTIONMENT OF
COMMUNITY BUSINESS WHERE APPRECIATION IS
ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE HUSBAND'S EFFORTS AFTER
SEPARATION, THE CORPORATE ENTITY MAY BE DIS-
REGARDED IF JUSTIFIED BY THE FACTS-In re Mar-
riage of Imperato, 45 Cal. App. 3d 432, 119 Cal. Rptr. 590(1975).
On July 10, 1969, Louis J. Imperato, who was then married
to Diana L. Imperato, incorporated Personalized Data Delivery
Service (PDD). PDD, which specialized in data processing
delivery, was actually an extension of a partnership between
Louis Imperato and his father; however, Louis became the sole
shareholder, president, and manager of the corporation.'
At the time of the Imperato's separation on December 30,
1971, PDD had a net worth of $1,665.85.2 Louis continued to
operate the corporation after separation, and eventually pro-
ceedings were instituted for dissolution of marriage. By June
30, 1973, the date closest to the date of trial for which proof of
value existed, the net worth of PDD had increased to$17,614.26.1 Prior to the trial the parties stipulated that the
business was community property.'
Mr. Imperato argued that the business should be valued
as of the date of separation.5 He also attempted to introduce
evidence to show that the corporate entity was nothing more
than a style or business name, and therefore should be treated
as a sole proprietorship instead of a corporation for the purpose
of determining the rights of the parties in the business after
separation.' The trial court rejected his contentions, ruled the
community property business would be valued at $17,614.26(the June 30, 1973, figure),7 and held inadmissible certain evi-
dence which would have been pertinent to the issue of his cor-
porate alter ego theory.' It was determined that the husband
1. In re Marriage of Imperato, 45 Cal. App. 3d 432, 434, 119 Cal. Rptr. 590, 591
(1975).
2. Id.
3. Id. Trial was held on August 22, 1973.
4. Id. at 434 n.1, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 591 n.1.
5. Id. at 434, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 591.
6. Id. at 438, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 594.
7. Id. at 434, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 591.
8. Id. at 438, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 594. Justice Traynor gave the following explana-
tion of the alter ego theory in a 1961 California case:
The figurative terminology "alter ego" and "disregard of the corpo-
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would retain the business and pay the wife her half interest in
it? Mr. Imperato appealed.
The California Court of Appeal focused on two important
issues in the case: the correct date for valuation of the com-
munity property,'" and proper apportionment of PDD's appre-
ciation in value between the date of separation and the date of
trial." Both questions involved interpretation of Civil Code
section 5118, as amended in 1971, which provides that the earn-
ings and accumulations of a spouse after separation are the
separate property of that spouse.2
The appellate court affirmed the trial court's ruling as to
the proper date for valuation, but reversed and remanded for
a determination of the issues regarding the control and growth
of PDD and the consequent problems of apportionment. 3
The petitioner husband based his argument for the date of
separation as the appropriate valuation date on language in the
1953 case of Randolph v. Randolph.4 In Randolph, one spouse
had operated the community asset floral business during a 20
rate entity" is generally used to refer to the various situations that are
an abuse of the corporate privilege. The equitable owners of a corpora-
tion, for example, are personally liable when they treat the assets of the
corporation as their own and add or withdraw capital from the corpora-
tion at will; when they hold themselves out as being personally liable for
the debts of the corporation; or when they provide inadequate capitaliza-
tion and actively participate in the conduct of corporate affairs.
Minton v. Cavaney, 56 Cal. 2d 576, 579, 364 P.2d 473, 475, 15 Cal. Rptr. 641, 643 (1961)
(citations omitted). Although Mr. Imperato was not attempting to establish personal
liability on the part of an owner, he was attempting to convince the court to disregard
the corporate entity on the basis of similar "abuse of corporate privilege."
9. 45 Cal. App. 3d at 434, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 591.
10. Id. at 435, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 592.
11. Id.
12. CAL. CIv. CODE § 5118 (West 1970), which became operative on January 1,
1970, originally provided: "The earnings and accumulations of the wife, and of her
minor children living with her or in her custody, while she is living separate from her
husband, are the separate property of the wife." This was the language of former Civil
Code section 169 (enacted in 1872), which was adopted in full. Cal. Stats. (1969), ch.
1608, § 8, at 3340 (operative January 1, 1970).
This section was amended in 1971 to read: "The earnings and accumulations of a
spouse and the minor children living with, or in custody of, the spouse, while living
separate and apart from the other spouse, are the separate property of the spouse."
CAL. CIV. CODE § 5118 (West Supp. 1975). The amendment became effective March 4,
1972. Cal. Stats. (1971), ch. 1699, § 1, at 3640.
This section should not be confused with section 5119, which provides for essen-
tially the same thing after the rendition of a judgment decreeing legal separation of
the parties.
13. 45 Cal. App. 3d at 440-41, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 596.
14. 118 Cal. App. 2d 584, 258 P.2d 547 (1953).
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year separation period. Nevertheless, the court held that valua-
tion of the business must be made as near as possible to the
date of dissolution of the marital community. 5 The Randolph
court pointed out that under then-effective Civil Code section
169,
when a wife lives separate from her husband her earnings
and accumulations are her separate property but . . . no
corresponding provision is made for the protection of adeserted husband. If such a provision would be desirableit would be the task of the legislature to make it. Until thisis done the deserted husband can find protection in the
diligent institution of a divorce suit only.'
In Imperato, the petitioner contended that the legislature
had responded to Randolph with a 1971 amendment to Civil
Code section 5118, making separate property of the husband's
earnings and accumulations during separation. 7 Therefore, he
argued, logic would dictate that valuation of the community
property should be made at the date of separation. Mr. Imper-
ato contended further that when the efforts of one spouse have
caused an increase in the value of an asset, that spouse alone
should receive the benefit of his labors.1
The rule of the Randolph case regarding the proper time
of community asset valuation has been followed consistently inCalifornia and. was applied by the trial court in the Imperato
case.' Between the time of trial and the court of appeal's deci-
15. Id. at 588, 258 P.2d at 549-50.
16. Id. at 586, 258 P.2d at 548. The text of former Civil Code section 169 is set
out in note 12 supra.
17. Actually, the legislature responded to the specific problem of a desertedhusband earlier than the husband contended. The 1955 amendment to Civil Code
section 175 changed it to read:
A husband abandoned by his wife is not liable for her support until
she offers to return, unless she was justified, by his misconduct, in aban-doning him, and the earnings of the husband during the period of unjusti-fied abandonment, prior to such offer, are his separate property; nor is ahusband liable for his wife's support when she is living separate from him,by agreement, unless such support is stipulated in the agreement.Cal. Stats. (1955), ch. 525, § 1, at 999. This section was repealed in 1969 and when itreappeared as CAL. CIV. CODE § 5131 (West 1970) of the Family Law Act, the separateproperty provision had been deleted and the section referred only to support. Cal.Stats. (1969), ch. 1608, § 3, at 3352, as amended, Cal. Stats. (1973), ch. 987, § 16, at
1902 (operative January 1, 1975).
See Ottinger v. Ottinger, 141 Cal. App. 2d 220, 296 P.2d 347 (1956).18. In re Marriage of Imperato, 45 Cal. App. 3d 432, 435-36, 119 Cal. Rptr. 590,
592 (1975).
19. Id. at 437-38, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 593-94.
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sion in the case, the Randolph rule was reaffirmed in In re
Marriage of Lopez,2 which became the basis for the Imperato
appellate decision. The Lopez decision considered the valua-
tion of a law practice as a community asset and reiterated that
"asset values and liabilities should be determined as near to
the date of trial as reasonably practicable." 2' However, the
court in Lopez went on to say:
[Slince the enactment of Civil Code section 5118,
effective March 4, 1972, any portion of the law practice
assets including goodwill which are attributable to the
earnings and accumulations of a spouse living separate
and apart are the separate property of the spouse earning
or accumulating the same. This could becsignificant where
the earnings of a professional person are substantial and
the time lapse from separation to trial is considerable."
According to the Lopez analysis, the valuation date for a
community asset should be as close as possible to the date of
trial; but if the earnings or efforts of one spouse in some manner
increase the value of the asset, the court must then determine
what portion of the asset is community property and what
portion is separate property.23
Confronting the time lapse problem, the Imperato court
noted that for one spouse to receive the entire increase in asset
worth during the time of separation would overlook "the inher-
ent growth factor found in many assets."24 Conversely, if the
asset lost value during the time of separation it would be unfair
to compel the spouse who devoted time to the asset to bear the
loss.,5
With the proper date for valuation of the community prop-
erty established, the Imperato court next considered apportion-
ment of the asset's appreciation from the time of separation to
the time of trial. Petitioner argued that since the corporate
20. 38 Cal. App. 3d 93, 113 Cal. Rptr. 58 (1974).
21. Id. at 110, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 68.
22. Id.
23. 45 Cal. App. 3d at 436, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 593.
24. Id. at 437, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 593.
25. Id. The court also pointed out that in this case the date of separation was
December 30, 1971, while the effective date of the amendment to section 5118 was
March 4, 1972. So for a short period only the wife's earnings and accumulations during
separation were separate property, while the husband's were still community property
by statute. Contra, In re Marriage of Bouquet, 16 Cal. 3d 583, 546 P.2d 1371, 128 Cal.
Rptr. 427 (1976).
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entity was nothing more than a business name, and since he
was the sole shareholder,6 PDD should be treated as a sole
proprietorship for determining the rights of the parties after
separation.
The court acknowledged that "the word 'earnings'
can encompass income derived from carrying on a business as
a sole proprietor where the earnings are the fruit or award for
labor and services without the aid of capital."" A stockholder
employee of a corporation, on the other hand, takes his earn-
ings in salary, bonuses and other benefits; 8 the earnings of the
corporation itself are corporation profits, not attributable to
individual employees or stockholders. In Imperato, the hus-
band paid himself a salary from PDD during the time of sepa-
ration, which the trial court treated as his total earnings." He
argued that a more realistic determination of his earnings
would be made by disregarding the corporate entity and con-
sidering PDD a sole proprietorship, in which case a portion of
the increase in worth during the period of separation would be
deemed his earnings rather than the corporation's. The hus-
band made an effort to introduce evidence in support of his
theory by presenting checks from both his personal bank ac-
count and PDD's bank account which were used to pay the
personal expenses of his wife.'" However, the trial court felt
bound by the Randolph rule, and other evidence pertinent to
the corporate alter ego issue was ruled inadmissible.'
In examining the husband's corporate alter ego theory the
court discussed Schoenberg v. Romike Properties,l2 wherein a
26. The court noted that the husband did not refer to his wife as a stockholder
in his brief, although she was because of her community interest. Id. at 437 n.5, 119
Cal. Rptr. at 593 n.5.
27. Id. at 437, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 593. The court cited Romanchek v. Romanchek,
248 Cal. App. 2d 337, 56 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1967), for support. In that case the wife owned
and operated a school of dress design before marriage. The school and other assets were
her separate property, but while she lived with her husband the income resulting from
her "personal character, ability, energy and capacity" was community property. Dur-
ing the period of separation the income derived from the school was her separate
property.
28. 45 Cal. App. 3d at 438, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 594.
29. Id.
30. In Schoenberg v. Romike Properties, 251 Cal. App. 2d 154, 59 Cal. Rptr. 359
(1967), the court considered similar evidence of use of funds to establish that a corpora-
tion was the alter ego of a husband and wife who were the sole shareholders.
31. 45 Cal. App. 3d at 438, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 594. The Imperato court noted that
at the time of trial Lopez had not been published, so there was no direct guidance for
the trial court.
32. 251 Cal. App. 2d 154, 59 Cal. Rptr. 359 (1967).
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corporate entity created by a husband and wife was asserted
in an effort to avoid personal liability for fraudulent represen-
tations made during a real estate transaction.33 After examin-
ing the structure of the corporation and the manner in which
the corporate funds were used, the Schoenberg court concluded
that "when all the conditions under which the brokerage busi-
ness was conducted are considered, nothing is wanting to en-
able the court to refuse to recognize the separate identity of the
corporation."34 This holding is in line with the rule that a cor-
porate entity can be disregarded when it is used to "defeat
public convenience, to justify wrong, or to perpetrate fraud."35
There is also a general rule that an incorporator should not
be permitted to ignore his own deliberately chosen corporate
form. " The Imperato court noted some exceptions. For exam-
ple, in Citizens State Bank v. Gentry,3" a licensed contractor
agreed to build a theater for the defendant and during con-
struction the contractor's license expired. Prior to expiration he
had incorporated his business and renewed the license under
the corporate name. 8 Defendant, refusing to pay for the work
performed, contended that no action could be brought on the
contract because the contractor was unlicensed. In the opin-
ion of the Gentry court it would have been unjust and inequi-
table to hold that the contractor was without capacity to sue.
The separate corporate entity was disregarded to permit the
finding that the contractor was licensed 40
In Seaboard Air Line Railroad v. Atlantic Coast Line
Railroad,4 two railroads succeeded to a corporation formed to
own and manage a bridge and trackage. When a controversy
arose over the right to build spur tracks, the court decided that
the separate corporate entity could be disregarded when the
rights of third parties were not involved.2
A commentator discussing Seaboard expressed the opinion
that while the corporate structure should not be disregarded
33. Id. at 165, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 367.
34. Id. at 167, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 368.
35. 18 C.J.S. Corporations § 6 (1939).
36. 6 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Corporations § 15, at 4327 (8th
ed. 1974).
37. 20 Cal. App. 2d 415, 67 P.2d 364 (1937).
38. Id. at 419, 67 P.2d at 366.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 420, 67 P.2d at 366-67.
41. 240 N.C. 495, 82 S.E.2d 771 (1945).
42. Id. at 512, 82 S.E.2d at 783.
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when the rights of third parties might be adversely affected, the
Seaboard approach is a reasonable method of settling the rights
of parties between themselves when the evidence demonstrates
that the parties do not follow corporate management proce-
dures, but merely use the corporation as a convenient device. 3
The Imperato court offered these cases as illustrations of
the "right of the courts to disregard the corporate entity at the
urging of a stockholder in special situations, providing the facts
support the alter ego theory."" The court concluded that such
a situation may exist when a husband and wife who are the sole
stockholders45 of a corporation are dissolving their marriage,
provided that they themselves have not treated the corporation
as a separate entity, and no third parties are involved.46 The
language is perhaps broader than the facts of Imperato require,
but the court apparently wished to indicate that while Mrs.
Imperato's interest in PDD was a community one, the same
rule would apply to cases in which each spouse held stock in a
community business in his or her own name.
Finding that a court may disregard the corporate entity at
the urging of a stockholder if the facts justify such a finding,
the Imperato court remanded the case to the trial court with
instructions to examine the evidence on the alter ego issue and
determine whether PDD was to be treated as a sole proprietor-
ship.4"
A question remained as to the proper method of allocation
should the trial court accept Mr. Imperato's argument and
determine that PDD ought to be regarded as a sole proprietor-
ship. The court of appeal noted:
In making such apportionment between separate and
community property our courts have developed no precise
criterion or fixed standard but have endeavored to adopt
that yardstick which is most appropriate and equitable in
a particular situation. . . depending on whether the char-
acter of the capital investment in the separate property or
the personal activity, ability, and capacity of a spouse is
43. Note, Disregarding Corporate Fiction, 68 HARV. L. REV. 541 (1955).
44. 45 Cal. App. 3d at 440, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 595.
45. Although the husband asserted that he was the sole shareholder, the court
had previously noted that the wife had a community interest. See note 26 supra.
46. 45 Cal. App. 3d at 440, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 595.
47. Id. at 440-41, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 595-96.
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the chief contributing factor in the realization of income
and profits.4
The basic approaches adopted by California courts are the
methods used in the cases of Pereira v. Pereira49 and Van Camp
v. Van Camp.55 The Pereira method, which is generally applied
when the court decides that the increased value of a separate
property asset or investment is due primarily to the skill and
efforts of a spouse rather than to "normal" return on capital,
involves determing what rate of return the spouse could reason-
ably have expected had he simply invested the separate capi-
tal. That amount is considered separate property; any excess
is considered the product of the spouse's efforts and treated as
community earnings.5 The Van Camp rule, on the other hand,
is applied when the court determines that, in view of the partic-
ular circumstances, the increased value is chiefly return on
capital investment. In that case, the court will allocate as com-
munity property an amount equal to a "reasonable salary" for
the time and skill contributed by the spouse, and the remain-
der will be classified as separate property. 2
The Imperato court noted that in this case the traditional
formulas would be applied in a reverse fashion. Both Pereira
and Van Camp involved a spouse who devoted community
time to separate property, while in Imperato the husband was
devoting "separate time" to community property.53 The princi-
ple, however, is the same, and the court of appeal declared that
it was up to the trial court to select the more appropriate of the
two methods if it found that the facts justified disregarding the
corporate entity.54
48. Id. at 439, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 595, quoting Beam v. Bank of America, 6 Cal.
3d 12, 18, 490 P.2d 257, 261, 98 Cal. Rptr. 137, 141 (1971). In Beam the husband had
substantial separate property before marriage. During the marriage the husband held
no regular employment to speak of, but managed his property and paid all the com-
munity expenses for the 17 years of marriage. The trial court used the Pereira ap-
proach, and as the total estate at the end of the marriage was less than an amount
representing a reasonable return on capital calculated at a normal growth rate, and
because of the presumption that the living expenses were charged against the com-
munity, the finding of no surplus community property was upheld. Despite generous
alimony and child support awards, the case has evoked some interesting criticism. See
Comment, Never Marry a Rich Man, 13 SATA CLARA LAW. 121 (1972).
49. 156 Cal. 1, 103 P. 488 (1909).
50. 53 Cal. App. 17, 199 P. 885 (1921).
51. 156 Cal. at 7, 103 P. at 491.
52. 53 Cal. App. at 29, 199 P. at 890.
53. 45 Cal. App. 3d at 438-39, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 594.
54. Id.
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The Imperato opinion reflects judicial acknowledgment
that amended section 5118 of the Civil Code was intended to
equalize the property rights of husband and wife upon separa-
tion and dissolution of marriage. 5 While recognizing that the
wife had an interest in PDD from its inception, the Imperato
court was willing to allow disregard of the corporate entity for
the purpose of apportioning the increase in worth so the hus-
band would receive fair compensation for his labors after sepa-
ration.5" This flexibility should lead to a more equitable deter-
mination of property rights in community property disputes.
Although Imperato appears to be the first case in Califor-
nia allowing disregard of the corporate entity to effect a com-
munity property settlement, such a procedure is based on the
traditional justification of avoiding an inequitable adjudica-
tion of rights." But it should be remembered that the facts of
the particular case must justify disregarding the separate
entity; it cannot be done as a matter of course.
Courts must proceed cautiously when evaluating com-
munity assets in the form of business or professional practices.
An inaccurate valuation can lead to an unjust division of prop-
erty, and this risk is increased when such intangibles as good-
will58 are included in the valuation. Although the Imperato
court did not discuss this issue, it was considered in Lopez. If
a business or professional practice valuation includes intangi-
bles and a court decrees payment to a spouse of one half the
business value, that value will be paid in tangible assets while
the one half retained by the spouse continuing the business will
include intangible assets.59 If the valuation is inaccurate, the
spouse retaining the business may end up with less than a fair
share of the community property. Hopefully, this problem can
be avoided if the courts continue to attempt equitable division
of property in the careful manner of the court in Imperato.
Stephen R. Oliver
55. See note 12 supra.
56. In re Marriage of Imperato, 45 Cal. App. 3d 432, 440, 19 Cal. Rptr. 590, 595
(1975).
57. See note 35 supra.
58. For discussion of the definition of goodwill and the sufficiency of evidence to
establish its value, see In re Marriage of Foster, 42 Cal. App. 3d 577, 117 Cal. Rptr. 49
(1974); Note, Valuation of Professional Goodwill upon Marital Dissolution, 7 Sw. U.L.
REV. 186 (1975).
59. In re Marriage of Lopez, 38 Cal. App. 3d 93, 110, 113 Cal. Rptr. 58, 68 (1974).
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RAPE INSTRUCTIONS-REQUIRING JURY TO
EXAMINE RAPE VICTIM'S TESTIMONY WITH CAU-
TION IS INAPPROPRIATE TO MODERN TRIAL PRO-
CEEDINGS-People v. Rincon-Pineda, 14 Cal. 3d 864, 538
P.2d 247, 123 Cal. Rptr. 119 (1975).
A young woman awoke in the early hours of July 10, 1973,
to discover a stranger lying beside her in her bed. When the
intruder refused to leave, she fled into her kitchen, only to be
beaten and choked until she ceased resisting. The man then
viciously raped and humiliated her.'
In spite of the victim's straightforward identification of the
defendant at the trial and other evidence corroborating her
testimony,2 the defense counsel interrogated her concerning her
prior sexual conduct in order to demonstrate that she was a
woman of "unchaste character," and therefore more likely to
consent to sexual intercourse.3 The trial judge read the manda-
tory jury instruction requiring the jury to examine the victim's
testimony with "caution."4 This first trial ended with a hung
jury. On retrial the woman retained counsel and refused to
answer questions relating to her previous sex experiences. Fur-
thermore, the trial judge refused to give the cautionary jury
instruction, and this time the defendant was found guilty of
rape, oral copulation, and attempted sodomy.' However, be-
cause of the trial judge's failure to give the cautionary instruc-
1. People v. Rincon-Pineda, 14 Cal. 3d 864, 867-68, 538 P.2d 247, 249-50, 123 Cal.
Rptr. 119, 121-22 (1975).
2. Id. at 868, 538 P.2d at 250, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 122.
3. COMMITTEE ON STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF Los
ANGELES COUNTY, CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL No. 10.06 (3d ed. 1970)
[hereinafter cited as CALJIC] instructs:
Evidence was received for the purpose of showing that the female
person named in the information was a woman of unchaste character.
A woman of unchaste character can be the victim of a forcible rape
but it may be inferred that a woman who has previously consented to
sexual intercourse would be more likely to consent again.
Such evidence may be considered by you only for such bearing as it
may have on the question of whether or not she gave her consent to the
alleged sexual act and in judging her credibility.
4. Id. No. 10.22 instructs:
A charge such as that made against the defendant in this case is one
which is easily made and, once made, difficult to defend against even if
the person accused is innocent.
Therefore, the law requires that you examine the testimony of the
female person named in the information with caution.
5. CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 261, 288a, 286, 664 (West 1973).
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tion, the court of appeal reversed the conviction
In a far-reaching opinion, the California Supreme Court
reinstated the conviction. Writing for an unanimous court,
Chief Justice Wright concluded that the trial judge's error was
not prejudicial;7 even more important, the court found that the
cautionary instruction was based on an unsubstantiated stereo-
type of rape offenses unsuitable to modem justice.
The California cautionary instruction originated in the
writings of Sir Mathew Hale, Lord Chief Justice of the King's
Bench from 1671 to 1676.1 Hale advanced the argument that an
infant prosecutrix should be allowed to address the jury
whether or not she was competent to be sworn, and that the
issue of credibility should be left to the jury.' Unfortunately,
much of this analysis has been distorted in its blanket applica-
tion to all sex offenses. Hale's famous aphorism that rape is "an
accusation easily to be made and hard to be proved, and harder
to be defended by the party accused" was probably true of most
crimes in the 17th century, considering the lack of procedural
safeguards for the defendant. Indeed, Hale's arguments may
have been directed toward a presumption of the accused per-
son's innocence, a fundamental precept of due process not yet
crystalized into law in Hale's era.'0
The California Supreme Court first incorporated Hale's
musings as jury instructions when it was confronted with the
6. People v. Rincon-Pineda, Crim. No. 25299 (Ct. App., 2d Dist., filed Dec. 16,
1974).
7. See People v. Watson, 46 Cal. 2d 818, 836, 299 P.2d 243, 254 (1956). The court
ruled that since it was "reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the
[defendant] would have been reached in the absence of the error," the conviction
must be reversed.
8. 14 Cal. 3d at 873, 538 P.2d at 254, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 126.
9. Id. at 874, 538 P.2d at 254, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 126.
10. Id. at 878, 538 P.2d at 256, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 128. Chief Justice Wright
commented:
Considering that under the Anglo-Saxon adversarial system of justice
"[W]hen a prisoner is undefended his position is often pitiable, even if
he has a good case," we recognize that there may well have been merit
to Hale's assertion that a prosecution for rape was an ideal instrument
for malice, since it forced an accused to stand alone before a jury inflamed
by passion and to attempt to answer a carefully contrived story without
benefit of counsel, or even a presumption of innocence. But the spectre
of wrongful conviction, whether for rape or any other crime, has led our
society to arm modem defendants with the potent accouterments of due
process which render the additional constraint of Hale's caution super-
fluous and capricious.
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uncorroborated testimony of a minor prosecutrix in People v.
Benson." The defendant was convicted of the rape of a
thirteen-year old girl who had lived with him and his wife.
Rejecting prior dicta, the Benson court ruled that evidence of
the victim's "acts of lewdness" with other men was admissi-
ble." Chief Justice Murray reasoned that "there would be less
probability of resisting upon the part of one already debauched
in mind and body, than there would in the case of a pure and
chaste female."' 3 Troubled by the possibility that a man might
be convicted on the uncorroborated testimony of such a "de-
bauched" female, the court ordered that a cautionary instruc-
tion be given the jury warning of "the danger of a conviction
on such testimony."' 4
The cautionary instruction was eventually extended to
non-rape sex offenses in which conviction depended on the un-
corroborated testimony of the victim. In People v. Lucas,'5 the
defendant, an ordained minister, was charged with contribut-
ing to the delinquency of a minor. Although the precise nature
of the defendant's crime is never specified in the opinion, the
court ruled that Hale's adage was mandatory instruction in
"all cases of this character."'" In another significant non-rape
case, People v. Putnam," the court carried the holdings of
Lucas an extra step by imposing an affirmative duty on the
trial judge to give the jury the ancient rape admonition in sex
offenses based on uncorroborated testimony.'" The defendant
in this case had allegedly committed a felony, sexually accost-
ing a minor."
A later case, People v. Nye, radically broadened the appli-
cation of the instruction by requiring that it be read to the jury
in all prosecutions of forcible rape, even when the complaining
witness's testimony was corroborated."0 Unlike the Benson,
Lucas, and Putnam cases, the testimony of the Nye victims
was amply supported by other evidence." Nevertheless, the
11. 6 Cal. 221 (1856).
12. Id. at 222.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 223, 224.
15. 16 Cal. 2d 178, 102 P.2d 102 (1940).
16. Id. at 181, 102 P.2d at 103.
17. 20 Cal. 2d 885, 129 P.2d 367 (1942).
18. Id. at 887, 129 P.2d at 368.
19. Id. at 886, 129 P.2d at 367.
20. 38 Cal. 2d 34, 40, 237 P.2d 1, 4 (1951).
21. Id. at 36-38, 237 P.2d at 2-4. The two victims, both adults and strangers to
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Nye court failed to differentiate cases in which physical evi-
dence was offered, and simply ruled that the cautionary in-
struction was necessary in all sex crime cases not requiring
such proof for conviction. 2 The trial judge's duty to give the
instruction was reiterated in the context of the Nye forcible
rape trial, making it "incumbent upon the court . . . to give
such an instruction of its own motion whether the alleged vic-
tim is a child or a mature person."23 The court justified its
heavy-handed approach by emphasizing the "danger of misin-
terpreting the defendant's acts as well as the danger of spite,
blackmail, vindictiveness, private vengeance, neurotic fabrica-
tion or fanciful imagination."4
The outcome of People v. Nye and other similar California
decisions is in large part attributable to the ingrained legal
stereotype of rape and rape victims.25 Perkins' criminal law
hornbook, defining rape as the "unlawful sexual intercourse
with a female person without her consent,"" typifies the popu-
lar attitude. Great emphasis is placed on the "unlawful" ele-
ment of the crime by Perkins; a woman can never be raped by
her husband because marital sexual intercourse is always "law-
ful," 7 thus negating this element of the crime. Once a woman
is married, her consent to sex with her husband becomes legally
irrelevant."5 This precept subtly implies that a woman's pre-
vious consent to intercourse may confer on a man a possessory
interest in her body. Carrying this line of reasoning further, a
woman who is sexually active on a casual basis has in some
sense already consented to all males, which explains why Pro-
fessor Perkins is so indignant at the idea that "even" a prosti-
tute can be raped." Thus, in order for a woman to convince thejury that she did not consent to the intercourse, she must first
each other, were attacked in their respective homes early in the morning. The testi-
mony of one of the victims was used as evidence of the defendant's intent in both of
the attacks. Two officers testified that the defendant had admitted the attacks. In both
cases, there was evidence of the defendant's entry.
22. Id. at 40, 237 P.2d at 4.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. For an excellent critique of the unfounded legal stereotypes existent in rape
law, see Note, The Rape Corroboration Requirement: Repeal Not Reform, 81 YALE L.J.
1365 (1972).
26. R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 5, 152 (2d ed. 1969).
27. Id. at 156.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 158.
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establish that the defendant, as a member of the male sex, did
not have a legitimate interest in her body that may have been
acquired as a result of her previous sexual conduct. CALJIC
No. 10.06 and Hale's cautionary instruction, read in conjunc-
tion, require the jury to determine the credibility of the vic-
tim's testimony in light of the proof of such conduct.
Besides stereotyping rape and its victims, courts have also
stereotyped the jury's reaction. A common rationale for the
cautionary instruction was that the shocking nature of sex
crimes led juries to convict as the "result of prejudice or popu-
lar excitement."3' However, as Chief Justice Wright pointed
out, the prejudice is usually against the victim.3 In The Ameri-
can Jury, Kalven and Zeisel discovered that the jury's procliv-
ity for finding mitigating circumstances in sex crime cases can
be carried to a "cruel extreme."3 Of the 42 cases of non-
aggravated rape the authors studied, the jury convicted in only
three cases. The judges in this grouping would have convicted
22 of the defendants. 33
Such legal and social biases against the rape victim un-
doubtedly explain why successful rape prosecutions are so diffi-
cult.34 Probably only 20 percent of all the forcible rapes com-
mitted in California are even reported to the police.35 Of those
arrested for rape, 28 percent are released outright by the po-
lice .3 And finally, forcible rape has a lower conviction rate than
17 out of 19 felonies listed by the California Department of
Justice .7
The court's ban on Hale's outworn instruction reflects the
modern reality of rape. The degradation a victim must suffer
in order to prosecute her attacker is probably one important
reason why rape is so grossly under-reported." A rape victim's
testimony and character are closely scrutinized. Her prior sex-
ual behavior is pried into, while the past of her attacker, even
30. People v. Benson, 6 Cal. 224 (1856).
31. 14 Cal. 3d at 880, 538 P.2d at 258, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 130.
32. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 251 (1966).
33. Id. at 253-54.
34. See generally Comment, Rape and Rape Laws: Sexism in Society and Law,
61 CALIF. L. REv. 919 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Rape and Rape Laws].
35. Id. at 921 n.8.
36. 14 Cal. 3d at 881, 538 P.2d at 259, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 131.
37. CAL. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME AND DELINQUENCY IN CALIFORNIA 16 (1973) (table
9, adult prosecution).
38. Comment, Rape and Rape Laws, supra note 34, at 921 n.4.
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if he is a convicted rapist, remains closed. 9 People v. Rincon-
Pineda confers upon the rape victim the same status enjoyed
by any other prosecuting witness in a criminal case.
This decision is in harmony with the California legisla-
ture's modification of the rules of evidence pertaining to rape
witnesses. The first change, known as the Robbins Rape Evi-
dence Law, prohibits evidence of the complaining witness's
past sex life offered to prove consent.40 An exception is made
for evidence of sexual activity between the defendant and the
witness. Before any such evidence can be admitted, however,
a hearing out of the jury's presence is conducted to determine
the relevance of the proposed evidence." The second change,
enacted within a month of the first, flatly prohibits the term
"unchaste character" in jury rape instructions.2 The use of
CALJIC No. 10.06, stating that a woman who has previously
consented to sexual intercourse would be more likely to consent
again, is also forbidden. 3
Because of the care the court exercised in safeguarding the
rights of the defendant while affording protection to the victim,
People v. Rincon-Pineda is a forward step for defendants in
some non-rape cases. The Rincon-Pineda decision requires the
trial judge to give the substance of CALJIC No. 2.20,11 espe-
39. CAL. EvID. CODE § ll01a (West 1966) provides:
Except as provided in this section, and in Sections 1102 and 1103, evi-
dence of a person's character or a trait of his character (whether in the
form of an opinion, evidence of reputation, or evidence of specific instan-
ces of his conduct) is inadmissable when offered to prove his conduct on
a specified occasion.
Contrast this protection afforded a rape defendant with the lack of protection for the
rape victim in section 1103 prior to August 30, 1974:
In a criminal action, evidence of the character or a trait of character (in
the form of an opinion, evidence of reputation, or evidence of specific
instances of conduct) of the victim of the crime for which the defendant
is being prosecuted is not inadmissable by Section 1101 if such evidence
is:
(a) Offered by the defendant to prove conduct of the victim in
conformity with such character or trait of character.
(b) Offered by the prosecution to rebut evidence adduced by the
defendant under subdivision (a).
Id. § 1103.
40. Id. § 1103(2) (West Supp. 1976), amending CAL. EvID. CODE § 1103 (West
1966).
41. Id. § 782.
42. Id. § 1127e.
43. Id. § 1127d.
44. CALJIC No. 2.20 instructs members of the jury:
Every person who testifies under oath is a witness. You are the sole
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cially those paragraphs relating to the witness's motives and
attitudes, in all cases in which a victim of the alleged crime
testifies.4" This holding could conceivably be interpreted to
cover such non-violent crimes as criminal fraud and forgery. In
criminal cases not requiring corroborating evidence, a category
which includes non-rape offenses such as assault and battery,
the CALJIC No. 2.22 "sufficiency of proof" instruction must
also be given.46 Unfortunately, the court has modified this in-
struction. The statement that "[t]estimony which you believe
given by one witness is sufficient for the proof of any fact" has
been qualified by the addition of a new instruction for cases not
requiring corroboration:
Testimony which you believe given by one witness is
sufficient for the proof of any fact. However, before finding
any fact to be proven solely by the testimony of any such
a single witness, you should carefully review all of the testi-
mony upon which proof of such fact depends. 7
and exclusive judges of the credibility of the witnesses who have testified
in this case.
In determining the credibility of a witness you may consider any
matter that has a tendency in reason to prove or disprove the truthfulness
of his testimony, including but not limited to the following:
His demeanor while testifying and the manner in which he testifies;
The character of his testimony;
The extent of his capacity to perceive, to recollect, or to communi-
cate any matter about which he testifies;
His character for honesty or veracity or their opposites;
The extent of his opportunity to perceive any matter about which he
testifies;
The existence or nonexistence of a bias, interest, or other motive;
A statement previously made by him that is consistent with his
testimony;
A statement made by him that is inconsistent with any part of his
testimony;
The existence or nonexistence of any fact testified to by him;
His attitude toward the action in which he testifies or toward the
giving of testimony;
His admission of untruthfulness;
His prior conviction of a felony.
45. 14 Cal. 3d at 883, 538 P.2d at 260-61, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 132.
46. CALJIC No. 2.22 instructs:
You are not bound to decide in conformity with the testimony of a
number of witnesses, which does not produce conviction in your mind,
as against the testimony of a lesser number or other evidence, which
appeals to your mind with more convincing force. Testimony which you
believe given by one witness is sufficient for the proof of any fact. This
does not mean that you are at liberty to disregard the testimony of the
greater number of witnesses merely from caprice or prejudice, or from a
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The problem with this instruction is that it suffers from the
defect that characterized CALJIC No. 10.22: it implies to the
jury that cause exists to disbelieve the victim. As Justice Pierce
pointed out regarding CALJIC No. 10.22 in his People v. Cady
concurrence, the People have the same right to impartiality as
the defendant.4" At least the new instruction lacks the sexual
discrimination implicit in the old cautionary instruction de-
rived from Hale, since it is to be extended to all cases not
requiring corroborating evidence.
Although old myths die hard, the People v. Rincon-Pineda
decision, together with the legislative changes noted, will help
insure that the myth of the treacherous female witness will not
be perpetuated in the criminal courts of California. Rape is
much worse than a mere sexual deviation from a social norm:
it is a brutal assault upon the physical safety and psychological
integrity of a human being. Judicial recognition of the reality
of rape will go a long way towards freeing women from its
oppressive threat.
Paul Jorgensen
desire to favor one side as against the other. It does mean that you are
not to decide an issue by the simple process of counting the number of
witnesses who have testified on the opposing sides. It means that the final
test is not in the relativ;e number of witnesses, but in the relative convinc-
ing force of the evidence.
47. Cal. 3d at 885, 538 P.2d at 261, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 133.
48. 267 Cal. App. 2d 189, 193-94, 72 Cal. Rptr. 772, 775 (1968) (Pierce, J., concur-
ring). Speaking of the weighty effect the old cautionary instruction has on a jury,
Justice Pierce noted:
In the opposite context it has been frequently pointed out that a jury
naturally attaches great importance to every statement by the judge
during a trial. Just as a trial judge must be careful not to say anything
that might be construed as a super-imposition of his beliefs of guilt upon
the beliefs of the jury, the People have the same right for strict neutrality.
The statement under discussion is one which carries a built-in connota-
tion that the jury must more carefully scrutinize the victim's testimony
than it does the defendant's.
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